THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT AND THE
COUNSEL FEES RULE: PROCEDURE OR
SUBSTANCE AND REMEDY?
Joseph M. Lynch*
PART I: THE COURT MAKES AND CONSTRUES
THE RULE
I.

INTRODUCTION

At the outset, the limits of this study should be set forth. This
work is intended as a general examination of the rule-making power
of the New Jersey Supreme Court. The vehicle is a detailed consideration of that court's attempt to regulate the particular area of counsel
fee allowances by the exercise of such power, and the consequences of
that attempt.
It is the initial premise of this study, based on a reading of the
key cases involved, that the subject of counsel fee allowances is really
not a matter of practice and procedure, but one of remedy in aid of
various substantive interests; that in consequence the court has, in attempting to regulate the subject by rule, acted beyond its legitimate
power. Therefore, we are concerned with the law of counsel fees in the
State of New Jersey not for its own sake, but that we may discover what
happens when a rule of court, purportedly procedural, operates in matters of substance and remedy. How does such a rule affect the development of the law of the subject it is intended to regulate? How is such
a rule construed, how applied? What role does policy play in its formulation, application and modification? What is the policy at work? What
role for the play of reason, that arbiter of consistency? In short, what
impact does such a rule have upon the rule-making system itself, the
supreme court, the inferior bench and bar, the litigants, the public in
general? To discover the answers to these questions will necessitate a
considerable knowledge of both the case law and the rule law regarding the subject of counsel fees as the necessary prerequisite to the basic
study: the process by which and in which a rule of court, in a matter
beyond the competency of the court to enact, is formulated and operates.
The methodology employed followed from this initial premise
0
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and inquiry. We shall take the rule on counsel fees from its beginning
in the circumstances which gave rise to its birth, trying to place ourselves as much as possible in the shoes of the court, so that we may the
better, through this historical-sympathetic approach, understand the
process of how this mistake came to be made, furthered and perpetuated. Thus, for the moment, we shall ignore the question as to whether,
in making such a rule, the court was correct. We shall examine it on
its own terms, follow the court in its early struggles to give meaning
to its provisions until the point in time, shortly after holding that in
the exercise of the rule-making power it is unreviewable, the court confronts the question: whether the matter of counsel fee allowances is
really one of practice and procedure and hence a subject for its regulation by rule.
When the court does face up to this basic issue, we face up to it
as well.' The court and I come to radically different positions. It is my
conclusion, here stated and supported, that the Rule is illegitimate. It
is the court's conclusion, here criticized and its authorities distinguished, that the Rule is proper.
Thereafter, we resume our historical survey of the rule in action,
as amended in the rule-making or legislative process, and as construed
in the adjudicatory process. By now, however, there is a difference. I
have concluded that the court was then acting improperly and it is
hard not to conclude further that the court in some fashion shared this
conclusion. There begins to grow the conviction that we are now walking in the tracks of absolute power, that in reading the cases and in
following the moves of the court we are witnesses to the art of absolute
government. It might be supposed that a system of absolute government, wherein the power to make rules regarding practice and procedure in the courts is made free of legislative supervision, has many
advantages: efficiency, consistency, reasonableness, and flexibility. But
it will be shortly seen that in the case of the rule regarding counsel
fees none of these advantages have come to pass.
This then is a study in absolute power, in the corporate psychology
of the body which exercises such power, and in the process by which
it operates. The methodology employed is primarily historical, secondarily analytical. The subject of counsel fees is purely incidental.
From this it will follow, that though the law of counsel fees is undoubtedly a hodge-podge, there is felt no compulsion to straighten out
1 It was the reading of the cases wherein that issue was posed and of the authorities
the court cited for its determination, which gave rise to the initial premise of this study,
that such allowances are not a matter of practice and procedure.
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the mess the court has created. Indeed, one can sympathize with the
court to this extent: the subject is messy and complicated; and the
proper remedy to be administered difficult to prescribe, requiring,
when given, a delicacy in the ministration.
Recommendations for such a reform would require a rather thorough study of the economics of the various kinds and phases of litigation; of the types of clients and lawyers involved, their patterns of
ethical behavior; of the judges, what manner of men are they, how
selected, how affected and unaffected by judicial experience, how subject to control by their judicial superiors; of the intermediate appellate
judiciary, its calibre and temperament, its working conditions; and finally, of the supreme court itself, its role in the judicial system, the
traditions it has inherited, modified and perpetuated. Without an understanding of all these factors, and without a comparative understanding of all the various counter-types in the English system, it would be
a mistake to establish in this American state, by and large, the blanket
system of counsel fees permitted under the English practice.
In any case, reform in the law of counsel fees must await the prior
reform in the manner in which that law is made. In this sense, as in so
many others, the procedure to be employed in the resolution of a problem determines in large part the contents of the solution.
II.

THE BEGINNING

In a sense everything in New Jersey that concers the judiciary begins on September 15, 1948, the date as of which, under the 1947 constitution, "[t]he Judicial Article of this Constitution shall take effect. ' 2
Article VI of that constitution, the judicial article, vests the judicial
power of the state in certain designated courts and describes the powers
of the various courts it has created. Upon the supreme court it confers
the special power to "make rules governing the administration of all
courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure
' 3
in all such courts.
In accordance with these provisions, the new court system began
its operation on September 15, 1948, governed by the rules of court4 prepared and already promulgated by the supreme court,5 under the direc2 N.J. CONsr. art. 11, § 4,
3 N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 2,

14.

3.

4 RULES GOVERNING THE CouRTs OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY (1948).

5 See 70 N.J.L.J. 421 (1947):
Much of the ground work for the program had already been done by Judge
Vanderbilt and those assisting him. The framework of the rules will be taken from
the Fedcral Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.
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tion of its Chief Justice-designate, Arthur T. Vanderbilt. The new
rules of court, based as they were in large part upon the heralded Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, were in themselves regarded as a new beginning. But a certain problem concerned the Chief
Justice-designate, for which the Federal Rules had made no provision,
that of counsel fees. In the federal practice there was no power to
award counsel fees generally, but a trial court sitting in an equity matter had, wherever the circumstances required, a discretion to do equity
by and through such an award. The extent of this power had been re7
vealed by case law precedent.
In New Jersey, the chancery court had theretofore, by statute, the
power generally of conferring a counsel fee award." But by 1948, the
practice in that court had, in the words of the present Chief Justice,
developed into a full scale scandal. We [had] developed a series of
fair haired boys who did very well, and litigants had the worry of
whether they could risk going into Chancery or defending there. 9
The mischief was remedied by a provision in the rules to take effect September 15, 1948, which took from the superior court, the successor to the court of chancery, the power to make an allowance of
counsel fees except in certain detailed instances.
3:54-7. Counsel Fees
No fee for legal services shall be allowed in the taxed costs
or otherwise, except:
(a) in a matrimonial action. In such an action the court in its
discretion may make an allowance to be paid by any of the parties
to the action, charging, if it deems it to be just, any party successful
in the action; but no allowance shall be made as to nonmatrimonial
issues joined with matrimonial issues; or
(b) out of a fund in court. The court in its discretion may
make an allowance out of such a fund, but no allowance shall be
made as to issues triable of right by a jury; or
(c) in an uncontested action for the foreclosure of a mortgage.
The allowance shall be calculated as follows: on all sums adjudged
to be paid in such an action amounting to 35,000 or less, at the
6 His appointment was announced by Governor Driscoll on Dec. 8, 1947, and submitted to the New Jersey Senate on Dec. 15, 1947, 70 N.J.L.J. 409 (1947); and confirmed
forthwith, 70 N.J.L.J. 424 (1947).
7 6 J. MOORE, FERAL PRACTICE
54.77(2), at 1348 et seq. (2d ed. 1948).
8 Law of April 3, 1902, ch. 158, § 91, [1902] N.J. Laws 540, as amended, Law of April
11, 1910, ch. 261, § 1 [1910] N.J. Laws 427; Law of March 30, 1915, ch. 116, § 6, [1915]
N.J. Laws 185 (both laws repealed 1951).
9 ADMINISTRATIVE

4 (June 16-17, 1966).
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rate of 2%; upon the excess over $5,000 and up to $10,000 at the
rate of 1%; and upon the excess over $10,000 at the rate of one-half
of 1%; or
(d) as provided by these rules or by law with respect to any
action, whether or not there is a fund in court. 10
There seems to be nothing in the way of a legislative history regarding the formulation of the Rule. The Tentative Draft had no
clarifying comment.'1 No discussion of the subject appears in the New
Jersey Law Journal of the time. This silence was probably deliberate
policy to end the "full scale scandal" without further scandalization,
and without the need of proving what might, in a court of law, be unprovable.
With this background in mind, it would be profitable to examine
the Rule to determine the underlying policy, and to evaluate policy
and rule in terms of consistency and reasonableness. The basic policy
would seem to be, as was later stated by the court so many times, that
each litigant must bear the burden of the costs of his own litigation.
And this policy extends generally in matters in equity as well as in
law. There are, however, exceptions.
The first of these, as set forth in the Rule, permitted the trial
judge, in a matrimonial action, discretion as to an allowance on matrimonial issues, but unaccountably not as to non-matrimonial issues.
For, if the general policy forbidding allowances will bend for the special case of a married woman in financial need in pursuit of matrimonial relief, it ought to bend in her favor in her attempt to relieve her
financial need by her suit as to property matters. Moreover, the Rule's
distinction between types of issues seems hardly justifiable if its policy
be based on the fear of the trial judge's allowances. If you trust him
sufficiently to empower him to award a counsel fee for services rendered
on the matrimonial issue, why not on the non-matrimonial issues?
An even harder task lies in the formulation of a sensible basis for
the exception carved out by the second paragraph of the Rule, that
allowing a fee "out of a fund in court." What or when is there a "fund"?
And why should the general prohibition be relaxed in its case? The
Tentative Draft Comment to the Rule did not refer to the "fund."
The Rule itself did not define it. Waltzinger, the pioneer commentator
to the New Jersey Rules, could not, in his initial commentary, account
10 N.J.R. 3:54-7 (1948).
11 The only comment regarding the Rule set forth in the Tentative Draft Comment
was as follows: "This rule does not supplant an allowance under [N.J. STAT. ANN. §] 2:2982.11." That statute [now § 2A:15-85] pertained to an allowance of counsel fees to a
claimant of an unclaimed deposit in the court of chancery.
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for its antecedents. 12 Wanting a definition, the term provoked a steady
flow of litigation over an eighteen-year period during the course of
which its meaning was revealed, extended, denied, shifted, and finally,
in the familiar judicial fashion, "explained." It is extremely doubtful,
as we shall see from the cases, that as of 1948, the court had, in using
the phrase, any clear idea in mind as to what it meant, and thus any
13
firm reason for relaxing the general prohibition in its case.
Let us pass on to the Rule's third paragraph, which permitted a
fee in an action for uncontested mortgage foreclosures, 4 but only on
the basis of a percentage schedule fixed by the rule. Under this provision, moneylenders are to constitute a special class of litigants, somehow worthy of special exception. The policy judgment is that their
expense in litigation should, in part, be passed on to the defaulting
debtor, but at a rate usually less than sufficient to compensate the
lender's counsel. There would seem no adequate reason for this exception, at least in the realm of justice. Such reasons as we can muster will
be "reasons of state": moneylenders are a pressure group, one of the
most successful in the business at that.
The final paragraph of the Rule, (d), was a catch-all, permitting
a fee where "provided by these rules or by law with respect to any action whether or not there is a fund in court." Thereunder, all sorts of
counsel fee awards allowed in other parts of the rules were approved:
in probate matters (R. 3:96-3); in discovery (R. 3:37-1 and 3); for a receiver (R. 3:66-4). Presumably, the Rule, by its use of the term "by
law," also meant to incorporate such allowances as were then authorized by statute. This is confirmed by the Tentative Draft Comment
which noted that the "Rule does not supplant the allowance under
[N.J. STAT. ANN. §] 2:29-82.1 l,"'15 relating to an allowance in the matter of an unclaimed deposit in chancery. There were other specific
statutory permissions not mentioned but apparently approved.' 6
12 2 F. WALTZINGRER, N.J. PRAcrTcE, at 874 (1949).
13 Nor has it been explained why, in a judicial system where law and equity have

been merged, an allowance should not be made "out of a fund in court" as to issues
triable of right by a jury. Cf. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Berenblum, 91 N.J. Super. 551,
221 A.2d 758 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 48 N.J. 138, 224 A.2d 323 (1966).

This curious

distinction has been maintained from its beginning in N.J.R. 3:54-7(b) (1948) through its
first revision, in N.J.R.R. 4:55-7(b) (1953), to its latest revision, in N.J.R. 4:42-9(a)(2).
14 The Rule was later amended to apply to all mortgage foreclosures, whether contested or not. The date of the amendment was Dec. 7, 1950. 73 N.J.L.J. 419 (1950). Thus
that unexplained distinction has been eliminated.
15 See note 11 supra.
16 For example, Law of April 3, 1902, ch. 158, § 92, [1902] N.J. Laws 540, as amended,
Law of March 20, 1908, ch. 21, § 1, [1908] N.J. Laws 34 (repealed 1951), authorized an
award in an action for partition; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3:33-11 (now § 3A:31-11) authorized
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Did the rule, by use of the term "by law," intend to incorporate
the then existing general authorization in the statutes for allowances
in matters in equity? No, it did not. And when, as we shall see, the
question was raised in the trial of a case in the fall of 1948, paragraph
(d) of the Rule was promptly amended so to provide. 17
Even so, the Rule on these terms does not make sense. If the basic
reason for the Rule, as latter-day testimony would have it, was the need
to end the scandal in chancery, the Rule as written was far too tolerant
in the scope of its authorizations. Either the given reason was not the
real reason or there were other factors intruding which made the official judicial policy difficult of realization. The latter is more likely the
case. If so, we can guess at what these factors were.
The subject of counsel fee allowances is complex. There may have
been a feeling at that point in time with the new court system about
to get under way, that the new rule on counsel fees, rough as it was,
was the best that could be produced under the then pressing circumstances. Rule now, amend later; give the reasons for it still later-that
may have been the policy. In addition, each of the specific statutory
permissions and some of the rules' various permissions favored somebody's special interest. A rule that ruthlessly excluded all of these might
have touched off a march on the legislature; which in turn might have
been very eager to reassert its authority, not only in the area of counsel
fees, but in the overall realm of practice and procedure, by a rapid reenactment of the exceptions. In the beginning, it should be remembered, it was generally understood that the court's power to make rules
regarding practice and procedure in the courts was, in being constitutionally "subject to the law," subject to legislative amendment.
Thus, if the Rule on counsel fees was unclear in its meaning, as
in paragraph (b), and arbitrary in its allowances and exclusions even
in the same action, as in paragraph (a), or in its selection of worthy
suitors, as in paragraphs (c) and (d), the damage could be repaired by
returning to the legislature for the enactment of further exceptions or
different restrictions. Or could it?
Was the court in its rule-making power "subject to the law" in the
sense of legislative amendment? Could a rule of court affecting a matter of "practice and procedure" be changed by later legislative enactment? This would shortly become a constitutional question of the first
an allowance to counsel secured to represent the estate of an incompetent veteran; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 (now § 14A:3-6) made provision for an allowance in a corporate
stockholder's suit.
17 See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
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magnitude in New Jersey and the subject of counsel fees would play a
crucial role in the raising of the issue and in its disposition.
In 1950, the court would reveal that it was not at all subject to the
legislature in matters of practice and procedure; and, apparently because its rule on counsel fees had been challenged by legislative action,
that it would eliminate from that rule any direct authorization by statute.
In originally adopting the Rule, the court had made an initial set
of determinations, if not assumptions: first, that the matter of an award
of counsel fees was one of "practice and procedure," and thus a matter
subject to regulation by rule of court; and second, that such a matter
is susceptible of regulation through the rule-making or legislative process, rather than through the case-by-case or adjudicatory process. In its
later amendment of the Rule, subsequent to its decision in favor of its
own exclusive power in matters of practice and procedure, the court
determined, with full knowledge of all the consequences, that it alone,
without help, could handle the subject of counsel fees prospectively in
the rule-making process.
From these determinations, there will be many consequences for
the subject of counsel fees, almost all of them bad. But in order to discuss them and understand, we must first recount how it was that counsel fees became subject to such determinations.
III.

THE RADICAL CHANGE OF 1950

The Power to Authorize the Allowance of Counsel Fees: The Legislature or the Court-A ConstitutionalIssue
The constitutional crisis, involving the rule-making power of the
supreme court, began with the case of John S. Westervelt's Sons v. Regency, Inc.18 The appellant in that case had, in November, 1948, been
denied a counsel fee following entry of summary judgment on the
ground such an allowance was not authorized under the new Rule.
Appellant argued against this denial on the theory that an allowance
was proper under the then existing statutes, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2:29131 and 132,19 which conferred upon the old court of chancery the
power generally to make allowances for counsel fees; and that the new
superior court, chancery division, was the successor to such statutory
power. The argument continued that either the Rule had incorporated
these statutes in the term "by law" in paragraph (d) or, if not, it was
18 3 N.J. 472, 70 A.2d 767 (1950).
19 See note 8 supra.
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an improper use of the rule-making power under the 1947 constitution
and therefore invalid.
By the time the case was argued in the supreme court, late in
1949, the Rule had been changed in the amendment of January 21,
1949,20 probably to forestall any further such arguments. It was the addition, in paragraph (d), of the clause: "but the authority, heretofore
vested in the Court of Chancery for the granting of counsel fees in
causes generally, is hereby superseded." Appellant, of course, relied on
the terms of the Rule in effect at the time of the trial court's disposition. But, as might have been expected, it did not matter. The court
affirmed the denial of an allowance. The Rule as originally drafted and
in effect in November, 1948, it said, was
plainly designed to be self-contained and exclusive.... The amendment [of January 21, 1949] was but a clarification of the original
purpose, not an amendment of that purpose. 2It is merely declaratory of the true meaning of the rule as it was. '
Had the opinion stopped there, it would have disposed of the appeal completely and neatly. Instead, it continued and opened the door
to trouble:
The construction of the phrase "by law" suggested by appellant
would radically modify the provisions of subdivisions (a), (b) and
(c) of the rule; and there is no good reason for supposing that this
qualification of the specific antecedent provisions was in contemplation. Quite the contrary. The phrase "by law" is operative in futuro;
it has-no retrospective significance; it was not intended that the
conflicting pre-existing statutes should remain in force. The rule
22
covers the field to the exclusion of all else.
There is a groping tone in this language, as though the court were construing the words of some mysterious legislative enactment rather than
the handiwork of its own creation. And groping, the court lost its way
and blundered. If the phrase "by law" were operative only "in futuro,"
this could mean, and perhaps was intended to mean, that all pre-1948
statutes on the subject of counsel fees were repealed by the adoption of
the rule in September, 1948. This would include the statute with regard to unclaimed deposits in chancery, in disregard of the Tentative
Draft Comment that the "rule does not supplant the allowance under
'
[N.J. STAT. ANN. §] 82.11. 23
With language this provocative, sweeping away all traces of the
20
21
22
23

72 N.J.L.J. 36 (1949). There were other minor changes affecting style.
3 N.J. at 477, 70 A.2d at 770.
Id. at 477-78, 70 A.2d at 770.
See note 11 supra.
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legislative past, and yet leaving room for a legislative future, it is not
surprising that the legislature reacted quickly. Westervelt's was published January 9, 1950. On March 8, 1950, Senate Bill 237 was introduced. 24 Its intent: to restore to the superior court the power to award
counsel fees which, prior to September 15, 1948, it had had generally
in chancery matters. In effect, if adopted, it would have constituted a
reenactment of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:29-131 and a repeal of Westervelt's.25 Its progress was fast. In just about a month, it passed both
houses. On April 12th, it was sent to the Governor for his approval. 26
In the meantime, on March 13th, the case of Katz v. Farber,27 involving once again a construction of the rule on counsel fees, had been
argued before the supreme court. Thus, while the legislature and the
Governor were considering the basic revision of the entire subject of
counsel fee allowances, the court had before it the construction of one
paragraph of its Rule. On April 24, while S. 237 sat on the Governor's
desk for his consideration, the opinion in Farberwas published. It is
perhaps thinkable that the coincidence of events had some influence
upon the contents of the opinion. Attempting to erase the unsettling
language of Westervelt's that the words "by law" in paragraph (d) of
the Rule were to operate only in Juturo, the court in Farberdeclared:
As may be inferred from subdivision (d) it was not intended that
the rule should supersede statutory provisions then extant (as for
example [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:14-2228] and [N.J. STAT. ANN. §
1950 [N.J.] SENATE JOURNAL 200.
The text of S. 237, reproduced in 73 N.J.L.J. 165 (1950), reads as follows:
BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New
Jersey:
1. In all causes and matters which prior to the fifteenth day of September,
one thousand nine hundred and forty-eight, were within the jurisdiction of the
former Court of Chancery, the Superior Court may make such allowances by way
of counsel fee to the party obtaining the order or judgment as shall seem to the
court to be reasonable and proper, and shall pay such allowances; or where such
allowances are ordered to be paid out of property or funds, shall specify and
direct the property or funds liable therefor.
2. The court may provide for the inclusion of such allowances in the taxable
costs, or provide for their collection in such other manner as is agreeable to the
practice of the court.
3. Such allowances shall be in lieu of any allowance for counsel fees provided
for by statute.
4. This act shall take effect immediately.
26 1950 [N.J.] SENATE JOURNAL 482, 490, 537; 1950 MINUTES OF [N.J.] ASSEMBLY 814-15.
27 4 N.J. 333, 72 A.2d 862 (1950).
28 This statute, now N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:14-20 (as amended by Law of March 19,
1953, ch. 14, § 32, [1953] N.J. Laws 124), authorized the former court of chancery to make
allowances to a receiver. This appeared to be covered under the then N.J.R. 3:66-5 (1948),
which therefore either superseded the statute or supplemented it.
24

25
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2:29-82.11)29] except as to the authority theretofore vested by statute
in the Court of Chancery for the granting of counsel fees in causes
generally, exemplified by [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:29-13130] and 132.31
The opinion thus recalled the intention of the draftsman of the
Tentative Draft that the "rule does not supplant the allowance under
[N.J. STAT. ANN. §] 2:29-82.11." Farber then attempted by an act of
moderation to restore the delicate balance achieved in the original conception of the rule whereby specific legislative exceptions to the policy
of prohibition would be honored.
As though encouraged by this tone of moderation, the senate,
without waiting for the Governor's approval of S. 237, the bill affecting
the allowances of counsel fees, proceeded on May 15 to the amendment
of a second bill, S. 294. It converted it from one affecting general statutory revision to one specifically affecting revision in all matters of
practice and procedure. Thus, it would seek to do generally what it
had done in one specific instance in passing S. 237: review the rules of
court, correct them and conform them to legislative policy. Thus
amended, the new bill was quickly approved and sent to the Governor
who signed it into law on June 2.32 Clearly, the new rules of court,
the handiwork of the new supreme court, were threatened.
But the court found its answering weapon ready at hand in the
forthcoming case of Winberry v. Salisbury,33 wherein oral argument
had been set down for June 19th. In Winberry, decided in the appellate division the previous September,3 4 the issue was whether the time
for perfection of an appeal to that court should be governed by rule
of court, effective September 15, 1948, or by a pre-existing statute. The
appellate division had held in favor of the rule, rejecting the argument
that the rule must fail because, being constitutionally "subject to the
law," it was subject to pre-existing legislation. That language, it said,
"referred to statutes that might thereafter be enacted by the Legislature .... ,,35
The decision of the supreme court in Winberry, rejecting the position of the appellate division, put an end to all half-measures. Coming only ten days after the date of oral argument, on June 29, it affirmed
29 See note 11 supra.
30 See note 8 supra.
31
32
83
34
35

4 N.J. at 343-44, 72 A.2d at 868.
Law of June 2, 1950, ch. 171, §§ 1-6, [1950] N.J. Laws 368 (repealed 1964).
5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950).
5 N.J. Super. 30, 68 A.2d 332 (App. Div. 1949).
Id. at 34, 68 A.2d at 334.
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the judgment of the appellate division dismissing the appeal, but without warning, rejected its opinion that "subject to the law" meant subject to legislative review. Instead, it rendered the term redundant. It
meant, wrote Chief Justice Vanderbilt, "but not in matters of substantive law. ' 36 Two justices disagreed,3

7

but the rest followed the Chief

Justice. The constitutional coup d'etat was accomplished.
Winberry, as an exercise in constitutional exegesis, its wisdom in
insisting upon a clear distinction between matters substantive and procedural, and in involving such distinction with the separation of the
powers between court and legislature (when in fact no such clear dis38
tinction exists), has been ably criticized and defended elsewhere.
What concerns us here is the effect of that decision upon the subject
of counsel fees: how it shaped the controversies regarding allowances,
affected the content of the Rule itself, and molded the rationales for
the decisions of cases.
For after Winberry, the authority to make law regarding counsel
fees had become a constitutional issue. And the effect of Winberry was
first felt here. On July 8, 1950, the Governor vetoed S. 237, the bill restoring to the superior court the power generally to award counsel fees
in equity matters. In his veto message he deplored the attempt to "revive an unhappy practice that has been generally repudiated," since in
the prior practice "[1]awyers demanded and occasionally received more
for their services than the case warranted." This did not seem a very
sure ground. An occasional abuse is inevitable in every use of power.
In the case of a trial court, the usual method of correction is appellate
review. Perhaps for this reason, the Governor sought an alternate
ground. The bill, he noted, raised constitutional questions since it conflicted with the rule-making power, in that RULE 3:54-7 had, by the
amendment of January, 1949, made it explicit that the general authority theretofore vested in chancery was thereby repealed.3 9
The final argument was naturally the decisive one. The legislature
recognized it as such. No further action was taken on the bill. No attempt was made to override the veto.
There was, to be sure, much storm and protest concerning Win86

See 5 N.J. at 247-55, 74 A.2d at 410-14.
37 Justice Case concurred only in the result, Justice Heher voted for reversal. Id. at
255-68, 74 A.2d at 414-20.
85 Winberry was critiqued by Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature'sRelation to Judicial
Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HtAv. L. REV. 234 (1951); for the

defense, see Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28
(1952).
39 1950 [N.J.] SENATE JOURNAL 1105-07.
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berry. Lower court judges muttered. Lawyers editorialized. Some legislators cried out usurpation and proposed a constitutional amendment
to override it. A movement was growing. The following year the senate
would undertake a series of hearings on the desirability of submission
to the electorate of a constitutional amendment. 40 While this movement held strength, all the rules were in jeopardy. If the movement
triumphed, clearly RULE 3:54-7 was marked for repeal.
Liberty Title-Counsel Fees: Remedy or Procedure?
It was in this climate of conflict that Liberty Title & Trust Co. v.
Plews41 came before the court for oral argument on October 16, 1950.
This case, crucial to the development of the law of counsel fees, requires a detailed examination. For in Liberty Title appellant, though
presenting a clear case for equitable relief, was denied an allowance
simply because she did not fall within the Rule, thereby establishing
the precedent that the Rule, not considerations of justice, was the inflexible guide in this matter. The court, rejecting appellant's argument
to the effect that a court having the power to do equity must not be
bereft of the power to fashion the remedy of counsel fees, reaffirmed
its basic assumption, without serious discussion, that an allowance of
counsel fees is a matter of procedure.
Liberty Title embodied two main questions: whether a trustee
bank, guilty of self-dealing and flagrant mismanagement to the detriment of its beneficiaries, could save itself from a surcharge by virtue
of a decree entered on intermediate accounting; and if not, whether in
addition it would have to pay counsel fees in the absence of an exceptionary provision in RULE 3:54-7.
The charge of wrongdoing had been raised by the beneficiaries in
1945 in the chancery court, thirteen years after the entry of the decree
in the intermediate accounting, in response to a petition for final accounting. Overwhelming proof was elicited at the hearings as to the
trustee's wrongdoings. The trial court filed its conclusions and supplemented them on September 10, 1948, five days before the effective date
of the judicial article of the 1947 constitution, but unfortunately, did
not then embody them in a final judgment. By virtue of the new constitution the case was transferred on September 15th to the superior
court, chancery division. On June 10, 1949, final judgment was entered.
40 For a summary of judicial, lawyer and legislative reaction to Winberry, see material cited note 34 supra; 73 N.J.L.J. 276, 284, 351, 359, 370, 383, 423 (1950).
41 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 219 (1950).
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In this judgment, the trial court surcharged the trustee some
$328,000 and awarded counsel fees in the approximate sum of $54,750.
On appeal, the appellate division reduced the surcharge to approximately $220,000 and the allowance for counsel to $37,500 plus disbursements. It noted that the trial had been completed well in advance
of the adoption of the new rules and that a formal judgment might well
have been entered before the date of transfer to the new superior
court. 42 Having saved itself some $125,000 in the appellate division,

the trustee applied for certification to the supreme court and there proceeded to save itself some $37,500 more. That court, disallowing any
award for counsel fees, rejected the reasoning of the lower courts. The
judgment in this case was one of the chancery division of the superior
court. The award for counsel fees was embodied in such judgment. At
the time of the entry of such judgment, such an award was prohibited
by the rule on counsel fees. It concluded with a quote from Westervelt's:

"[T]he incidents of a judgment are ordinarily governed by the state
of the law at the time of the entry of the judgment. The taxation
of costs is essentially procedural, generally affecting the remedy
only. This principle also disposes of appellant's further contention
that they are entitled to counsel fees for services rendered prior to
the effective date of the Judicial Article of the Constitution of
1947."43
The judgment was harsh. As of September 14, 1948, Mrs. Plews was
entitled to a judgment of $37,500. The following day she was not. The
judgment was unfeeling. The parties to the case were a defending bank,
a corporate institution in the business of advertising its fidelity and getting paid for it, convicted of infidelity; and the defrauded beneficiaries,
one of them, the testator's widow. The widow, regardless of need, must
bear the burden of litigation, which in the judgment of the appellate
court, amounted to the reasonable sum of $37,500. This is the policy
of the new rule.
It is not surprising that the trial judge, regarding himself as sitting
to do equity, was of the view that the Rule was not applicable to his
court, that the chancery division of the new superior court had the
same basic jurisdiction to award counsel fees in a proper case as did the
former court of chancery. This power is inherent in a court having
42 6 N.J. Super. 196, 213-14, 70 A.2d 784, 793 (App. Div.

1950).

6 N.J. at 44, 77 A.2d at 226. This language was taken from Westervelt's, but in that
case summary judgment had been entered in the chancery division of the superior court
on Nov. 16, 1948, after the effective date of the new rules. Liberty Title is an extreme
application of the principle.
43
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jurisdiction over trusts and trustees and is not derived from statute or
rule. One might summarize the argument this way: a court of equity,
44
call it by any name you like, must have the power to judge equitably.
And it is not surprising that Chief Justice Vanderbilt reserved for himself the task of writing the opinion in Liberty Title. For the view just
expressed was a direct challenge to the power of his court to make rules,
an attempt to suggest limits to the rule-making power, a challenge of
constitutional proportions.
The critical provision of the constitution is Article XI, section IV,
paragraph 3. It reads as follows (and in view of what is to come it warrants a careful reading):
The Court of Errors and Appeals, the present Supreme Court,
the Court of Chancery, the Prerogative Court and the Circuit
Courts shall be abolished when the Judicial Article of this Constitution takes effect; and all their jurisdiction, functions, powers and
duties shall be transferred to and divided between the new Supreme
Court and the Superior Court according as jurisdiction is vested
in each of them under this Constitution.
The Chief Justice did not set forth a faithful verbatim quotation
of that paragraph, instead, he summarized the section as providing
that the "jurisdiction, functions, powers and duties" of the Court
of Chancery be "transferred to and divided between the new Supreme Court and the Superior Court according as jurisdiction is
vested in each of them under this Constitution." 45
Now under another provision of the constitution, his line or argument continued, the supreme court has exclusive power to make rules
governing practice and procedure in all courts. Accordingly, the power
44 This view was attributed to the trial court in the opinion of Chief Justice Vanderbilt in 6 N.J. at 42-44, 77 A.2d at 226. Actually, the trustee had filed for approval of its
final account in the Orphans' Court of Atlantic County wherein thirteen years before it
had received approval of its intermediate accounting. Hearings on the exceptions to that
account and on the issue of opening the decree approving that account were held in the
orphans' court and briefs filed there, but before the matter was decided the trial judge
was appointed Vice-Chancellor to the court of chancery. With consent of the parties, the
matter was transferred to the court of chancery for disposition by the same judge. Liberty
Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 142 N.J. Eq. 493, 60 A.2d 630 (1948). But the supreme court
did not consider this circumstance relevant. Incidentally, the trial judge was Vincent S.
Haneman; and the author of the opinion in the appellate division was Nathan Jacobs,
both of whom thereafter were appointed as associate justices of the supreme court.
45 6 N.J. at 43, 77 A.2d at 226. One wonders how the late Chief Justice would have
dealt with an advocate who appeared before him guilty in his brief of such a summary,
wherein the courts whose jurisdictions are abolished are reduced to the single court of
chancery, and all reference to the jurisdiction of the court of errors and appeals is suppressed, thus making it appear that the jurisdiction of old chancery had been divided
between the new chancery division and the new supreme court.
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of the old chancery court with respect to practice and procedure in its
court has passed on to the new supreme court. Such power as the new
chancery division of the superior court may have in this regard, it has
as coming from the new supreme court as formulated in its rules. Specifically, "the authority, heretofore vested in the Court of Chancery for
the granting of counsel fees in causes generally, is hereby superseded,"
46
RULE 3:54-7(d) .
Implicit in this argument is the assumed premise that the power
of a trial court to award counsel fees is a matter of practice and procedure. This premise indeed had been the basis for the decision in
Westervelt's that allowances for counsel fees are not permitted in a case
outside the exceptions set forth in the rule, even for services rendered
before the effective date of the Rule.
But appellants' position had not been that the old chancery court
could award a fee as part of its power to make rules regarding its own
practice and procedure. Rather the gist of their contention was that
chancery could award a fee as part of its power to do equity. Equity
does what ought to be done. To pass judgment, to order judgment is
the fundamental function of a court. To pass and order judgment in
accordance with principles of equity, to embody justice so ordered in a
decree is the fundamental function of an equity court. To deny it that
power is simply to take away part of its jurisdiction.
In other words, that part of a judgment wherein an equity judge
awards a counsel fee in the sum of $37,500 constitutes, as does the
other parts of the judgment, the response of that judge, in an ordered
statement having legal consequences, to all the facts of the case. It
operates on the same level and with the same function as the other
parts of his decree, such as an award of a surcharge or the issuance of an
injunction, if that be necessary to do equity. No one would seriously
argue that the power to surcharge for a specific sum or the power to
enjoin is a matter of practice and procedure. The surcharge and injunction are devices to accomplish the ends of justice. They are specific
remedies. So is an allowance for counsel fees. The fundamental error
in Liberty Title was to incorporate within "practice and procedure"
the concepts of "jurisdiction" and "remedy," as though all 47that is not
clearly "substantive law" must be "practice and procedure.
46

6 N.J. at 43, 77 A.2d at 226.

47 Ultimately, it incorporated portions of substantive law as well, as will be more

evident in the subsequent analysis. For later manifestations of the view that "jurisdiction"
is part of "practice and procedure," see N.J.R. 4:4-4 governing acquisition of jurisdiction
in personam; N.J.R. 4:4-5 governing acquisition of jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem and
N.J.R. 1:13-4 governing transfer of actions from court to court for the purpose of acquisition of jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
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To return to fundamentals, a remedy is the redress, relief or cure
of a wrong (the very word remedy means "cure"). A judicial remedy is
the redress, relief or cure of a wrong presented before the court by a
complaining suitor in the course of litigation according to prescribed
rules governing the trial of issues arising from such complaints. There
are various kinds of judicial remedies: damages, injunctions, foreclosure, declaration of rights and liabilities. Courts have varied their
remedies to do justice as best they can.
Each wrong arises out of the breach of some body of law. A suit
for personal injuries in negligence follows upon a breach (or so it is
alleged) of the law of torts prescribing the duty of care. The law of torts
being a branch of what is usually called the substantive law, a personal
injury damage award could be called a substantive remedy. More
exactly, it is a judicial remedy of a wrong established by reference to
the prescriptions of substantive law.
There are also judicial remedies arising from a breach of duty
prescribed by the law governing procedure; for example, an order for
a more definite statement of a pleading.4 8 Under the rules governing
pleading the moving party has the right, if he has the duty to respond
to a pleading, to have before him a pleading not so vague or ambiguous
as to render his task of responding practically impossible. The order
for more definite statement is in aid of such right. One could say that
such an order is a procedural remedy. It would be preferable to call
it a judicial remedy of a wrong established by reference to the law
affecting procedure.
But as a matter of custom, the term "remedy" has been reserved for
the judicial remedy of a wrong established by reference to the prescriptions of substantive law. What sort of remedy is the allowance of a
counsel fee? The commonest remedy in the law is the award of pecuniary remuneration or, more plainly, money damages. The rules governing the amount of compensation to be awarded in a particular matter,
in other words the measure of damages, have been systematized in a
succession of treatises. As Sedgwick pointed out with approval in his
of
treatise on Damages, Blackstone ranked damages among that "species
49
property that is acquired and lost by suit and judgment at law."
Sedgwick regarded the allowance of counsel fees as, in the situation
involving merely adverse parties, basically a part of the law of the remedy of damages. In his view:
The expenses of a litigation to obtain compensation would seem to
48 See N.J.R. 4:6-4.
49 1 T. SEDGWICK, DAMAGES
2 W.

§§

5, 29, at 6, 28 (8th ed. A. Sedgwick & J. Beale, Jr. 1891);

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0 438.
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be, though not a direct, certainly a natural and proximate consequence of the injury, and hence to belong to that class of consequential losses which can be recovered. The true foundation of
the rule [disallowing counsel fees] we take to be that the common
law has arbitrarily fixed taxable costs as the limit of remuneration
for expenses of litigation. 50

Dean McCormick, in his treatise on damages, pursued this argument of Sedgwick that an award of counsel fees and other such expenses was justified as a natural and proximate element of damage
caused by the injury involved in the litigation. 51
Implicit in this argument is the fact that the injury is recognized
to be such in and by the rules of substantive law. In the case of Mrs.
Plews against Liberty Title and in similar cases, the injury would seem
to lie in the impingement by one suitor of another's "interest in freedom from unjustifiable litigation." 52 If so, we are in the realm of that
difficult area of the substantive law where the boundaries of torts, contracts and agency converge.
In just these terms, an impingement of another's "interest in freedom from unjustifiable litigation," Harper and James5" have analyzed
the tort of malicious prosecution and the subsequent award of damages,
including an award for counsel fees. As they point out, the principle
has been applied to malicious prosecution of civil as well as of criminal
cases, albeit in New Jersey, as in a minority of other states, the rule has
been confined in civil cases to suits affecting arrest or attachment or
54
some similar control over property.
50

T.

SEDGWICK,

supra note 49, § 230, at 339. See generally Id. §§ 229-41, at 338 et seq.

51 C. MCCORMICK, LAw OF DAMAGES

§§ 60-71, at 234 et seq. (1935). The argument was

first set forth in his article, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element
of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619 (1931). It should be noted that the present position of
the New Jersey Supreme Court is on the merits in line with the overwhelming majority of
American courts, although it represents a sharp reversal from the pre-1948 practice in
New Jersey. It is against this majority position that both Sedgwick and McCormick argued.
It should be recalled that it is not the purpose of this study to take a position on the
merits of this dispute. In recent years others have joined this argument in favor of an
approach to the English position: Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the
Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966); Greenberger, The Cost of Justice: An American
Problem, An English Solution, 9 ViLL. L. REv. 400 (1964); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee:
Why not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REv. 75 (1963); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included
in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966).
52 This is not to say that such an interest is the only one to be recognized and given
protection by the allowance of a counsel fee. There are others, including that to which the
New Jersey Supreme Court had given recognition and protection in its provision regarding "fund in court," based on considerations of prevention of unjust enrichment.
53 1 F. HARP'ER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 4.2, at 302 (1956).
54 Id. §§ 4.2, 4.8, at 302, 326. See Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139,
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There are other closely related torts, for example, the deliberate
interference with another's contractual performance by making it more
onerous, as where a defendant is held answerable in damages for deliberately dumping stones on a municipal road, thus increasing the expense to a party (the plaintiff) under contract with the municipality to
keep the streets clear and clean. In another and related case, liability
was similarly placed upon one who negligently crashed into and
damaged a bridge in a suit brought by the party under contract with
the public agency, the owner of the bridge, to keep it in repair. 55
There are factors distinguishing these cases from the counsel fee
situation. In the latter case, counsel is an agent rather than an independent contractor and while his performance may be made more
onerous, it is not he who must perform at a loss, although as a practical
matter this is often so. It is the client-principal who must pay the
reasonable value of his services which, by virtue of the sometimes
malicious, sometimes stupid conduct of a suit by an adversary, are
made the more onerous. It is for this reason that the counsel fee, when
56
allowed, is considered the property of the client and not the counsel.
More in point is the case of agent-harassment, which Prosser considers a kind of tortious interference with a contractual relation. He
cites the case of regional manufacturers who, objecting to the intrusion
in their area of agents for an out-of-state manufacturer of farm wagons,
followed them in their progress through the region, harassing and
heckling them in such a fashion as to destroy their business. Such activity was held actionable in a suit by the foreign manufacturer for
injunctive relief. While the case did not involve a claim for money
damages for the additional cost to the agents' expenses, Prosser coupled
the agent-harassment situation with the malicious prosecution line of
cases.

57

83 A.2d 246 (Ch. 1951), aff'd, 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952), wherein the principle was
stated more broadly as applying when a defendant was
made to suffer other special grievance different from and superadded to the
ordinary expense of a defense.
Id. at 151, 83 A.2d at 252 (quoting from Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 382, 386 (1816)). The
Mayflower court went on to point out that the grievance need not be "special":
So a suit for malicious prosecution will lie where the plaintiff's property or business has been interfered with by the appointment of a receiver, the granting of
an injunction, by writ of replevin, by the filing of a lis pidens, or the preferment
of charges against a police officer which results in his suspension from duty.
Id. at 152, 83 A.2d at 252 (quoting from 1 T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS § 128, at 426-27 (4th
ed. 1932)).
55 See F. HARPmE & F. JAMES, supra note 53, §§ 6.9, 6.10, at 499 et seq.
56 Poch v. Haag, 105 N.J. Super. 44, 251 A.2d 132 (App. Div. 1969).
57 W. PRossrR, LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 950 et seq. (3d ed. 1964), especially 950 n.35;
Evenson v. Spaulding, 150 F. 517 (9th Cir. 1907).
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To summarize the argument: first, a person has an interest in
freedom from unjustifiable litigation which to some extent the courts
will protect. For the infringement of this interest thus protected an
allowance of counsel fees will be made, the interest thereby becoming
a "right" and the infringement a "wrong." Second, the determination
of the extent of such protection is a matter of substantive law, involving
elements of the laws of contracts, agency and torts. Third, the remedy
of the actual allowance involves at the same time the judicial response,
its statement of its determination of protection, and its assessment of
the amount of compensation due. In short, the allowance, if made and
to the extent made, is a judicial remedy of a wrong established by reference to the rules of substantive law.
The courts in general have not been blind to this. In the recent
case of Fleischmann Brewing Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 58 the United
States Supreme Court had before it the question whether, for a deliberate infringement of a valid trademark arising under the Lanham
Act, 59 plaintiff was entitled to an award of counsel fees where section

3560 of the Act, enumerating the available compensatory remedies,
failed to provide for counsel fees. The Court decided against an allowance for counsel fees on the following basis:
When a cause of action has been created by a statute which expressly provides the remedies for vindication of the cause, other
remedies should not readily be implied.... We ... must conclude

that Congress intended § 35 of the Lanham Act to mark the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in cases arising under
the Act. A judicially created compensatory remedy in addition to
the express statutory remedies is inappropriate in this context. 61
And on various occasions since Liberty Title, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey has in practice, as we shall see later in detail, followed
this argument. In an action involving improper use of a trademark, that
court directed the trial judge to allow a reasonable counsel fee in lieu
of such relief as might be had from a time-consuming and expensive
accounting. 62 Prior to that, it had permitted enforcement of a contractual provision in a promissory note for the payment of a reasonable
attorney's fee. 63 Again it held that a defendant insurance company was
58 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
59 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (1963).
60 15 U.S.C. § 1117.
61 386 U.S. at 720-21.
62 Red Devil Tools v. Tip Top Brush Co., Inc., 50 N.J. 563, 575, 236 A.2d 861, 868
(1967). This case will be discussed at length infra.
63 Alcoa Edgewater No. 1 Fed. Credit Union v. Carroll, 44 N.J. 442, 210 A.2d 68
(1965). This case, along with companion cases, will be discussed at length infra.
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obliged to pay "as a traditional element of damage" the counsel fee
incurred by the assured in defending a prior workmen's compensation
proceeding which the insurance company had wrongfully refused to
defend on her behalf.6 4 And even as early as 1952, just two years after
Liberty Title, it approved the statement:
In malicious prosecution cases the well nigh universal rule is
that reasonable costs and counsel fees incurred in defending the
action maliciously brought, are an element of damage. 65
The vice of the New Jersey Supreme Court's position on counsel
fees since 1950 has not been a consistent blindness to the justifiable
demands for the inclusion of counsel fees as an item of damages. Rather,
it has been a persistent inconsistency of adjudication: in one case approving an allowance as being an "element of damage," not needing to
fall within the Rule; in another, excluding the allowance as, being a
matter of "procedure," not falling within the Rule. In practice, the court
has been arbitrary both in its application of the Rule and its reading
of the Rule when applied.
This inconsistency hides the fundamental confusion emanating
from its basic assumption made in 1948, that the allowance of counsel
fees is a matter of "practice and procedure" and therefore a matter for
court rules; and from its holding in Liberty Title that the power to
make such an allowance is not a basic power of a trial court sitting in an
equity matter, 66 but rather a power conferred by the supreme court in
a rule of "practice and procedure."
The correct assessment of the problem is implicit in the United
64 Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 225 A.2d 328 (1966). This is discussed infra.
65 Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super 139, 175, 83 A.2d 246, 264 (Ch.
1951), aff'd, 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952). This case is discussed infra.
66 Since 1948, the prior separate jurisdictions of "law" and "equity," held by the
former supreme court at law and former court of chancery in equity, have been merged
in the superior court. That court, pursuant to N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 3, 2, has "original
general jurisdiction throughout the State in all causes." And though the trial part of that
court has, by the terms of N.J. CONsr. art. 6, § 3, 3; been divided into two divisions, law
and chancery, either division has the full jurisdiction of the court and can accord such
remedy as needed to do complete justice in the causes before it, whether legal or equitable.
N.J. CONST. art. 6 § 3, 4; O'Neill v. Vreeland, 6 N.J. 158, 77 A.2d 899 (1951). Since this is
so, since Alcoa, Gerhardt and Mayflower (see notes 63, 64, and 65 supra) were cases at law,
involving claims for money damages; and since the Sedgwick-McCormick thesis is that the
award for counsel fees against one's adversary is part of the law of compensatory damages,
it would be preferable to consider Liberty Title as the case wherein it was held that a
trial court does not have the power to fashion the remedy of counsel fees outside the Rule
despite that court's general jurisdiction to hear "all causes" and to accord such remedies
as needed to do complete justice.
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States Supreme Court opinion in Fleischmann.67 There the Court held
that the remedy of a counsel fee allowance was not available, not because it was a matter of procedure, but because the statute creating the
cause of action had not included, and thus by implication had excluded, the remedy. In effect, the statute by this implicit exclusion had
also implicitly so confined the extent of the substantive wrong as not
to include therein the impingement upon the trademark holder's interest in freedom from unjustifiable litigation. The interest was thus unprotected. Therefore, for the trial judge to create and confer the remedy
of counsel fee, though not mentioned in the statute, was in reality to
recognize as protected the trademark holder's interest in freedom from
unjustifiable litigation, thereby contravening the statutory policy. Such
a remedy was "inappropriate in this context" because it would amount
to judicial supremacy instead of legislative in the matter of declaring
the limits of substantive rights and wrongs. It is not that the trial court
lacked the power to grant such a remedy in the strict jurisdictional
sense. It is that to do so in that case would be an abuse of the usual
power to fashion remedies-"inappropriate," and hence reversible
error.
Unfortunately, in the New Jersey Supreme Court's assessment of
the problem, all the categories which in Fleischmann are implicitly
separate and distinguishable-jurisdiction, remedy-damages, substantive law and procedural, rights and interests, duties, wrongs, legislative
supremacy in substantive matters and judicial deference thereto-become confused and blended. In this way, the contents of a judgment
become confused with the manner and method of judgment and are
referred to as its "incidents ...essentially procedural, generally affecting
the remedy only." 68 The power to fashion remedies and thus to shape
the extent of substantive rights and duties is treated as a piddling
67 The Supreme Court acknowledged the movement for adoption of the English practice in this country. It set forth the arguments in support of the retention of the American
rule: the uncertainty in outcome in litigation; discouragement to the poor litigant, and
the consequent strain upon judicial administration in determining the issue of a reasonable attorney's fee. It then mentioned the exceptions it had permitted in the past to the
general exclusionary rule: in admiralty "in appropriate circumstances," in civil contempt
following disobedience of a court order, in common fund cases (read: "fund in court" in
New Jersey) to prevent unjust enrichment. It concluded:
The recognized exceptions to the general rule were not, however, developed in
the context of statutory causes of action for which the legislature had prescribed
intricate remedies. Trademark actions under the Lanham Act do occur in such
a setting.
386 U.S. at 719. Thus the Court carefully avoided the issue as to whether in the case of
statutory causes for which "intricate remedies" have not been prescribed or in the case of
judicially-created causes, further exceptions should be made to the general American rule.
68 See note 43 supra.
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branch of "practice and procedure," not worthy of detailed analysis.
Procedure, so far from being the handmaiden of substantive law, has
become in reality its domineering mistress.
And due to the ingenuity of Winberry, there is no escape. Inasmuch as the allowance of counsel fees is deemed procedural, the subjectmatter is not susceptible of correction by legislative enactment. Only
a constitutional amendment can change the result. And in the case of
counsel fees, it is not to be expected that the legislature would refer
the matter to the electorate for change. 69
Therefore, because of Winberry, the only escape is within the supreme court itself, in retreat from Liberty Title. The failure to make
the escape has entailed serious and harmful consequences. Some matters,
such as the fashioning of remedies in all cases, just cannot be regulated
in advance. Justice cannot be programmed, even if the art of formulation of rules of procedure were in a more advanced stage of perfection
than it is today. The attempt therefore to "rule" the fashioning of
remedies is bound to fail and to fail badly.
But such were the consequences of Liberty Title. And the case itself
had its inevitable sequel. Although it implied that the allowance of
counsel fees was not a matter of substantive law, it did not, the issue
not being presented to the court, so hold. It was not until 1953, in the
case of State v. Otis Elevator Co., 70 that the court did so. Chronologically, Otis is out of place in a section devoted to the radical changes
made in the law of counsel fees in 1950, but since in Otis the court set
forth its defense of RULE 3:54-7 and the underlying premise that counsel
fees are a matter of procedure, it is better to discuss the case at this
point.
Otis Elevator-Counsel Fees: Substance or Procedure?
Otis involved proceedings in the chancery division of the superior71
court brought by the State pursuant to the New Jersey Escheat Act.
As provided by the statute, Otis was ordered by the court to answer the
complaint, 72 retain all escheatable property then in its custody until
further order, and disclose to the plaintiff in its answer such informa69 N.J. CONsT. art. 9 requires that after approval by three-fifths of all the members of
each of the respective houses of the Legislature, the specific proposed amendment must be
submitted to the people at the next general election for approval by a majority of those
voting therein.
70 12 N.J. 1, 95 A.2d 715 (1953).
71 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2:53-15 to -32 (now N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:37-11 to -28 (1952)).
72 The complaint had alleged in general terms only that Otis had in its custody certain personal property that had escheated to the state.
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tion regarding such property as was pertinent and would cause a speedy
determination of the action.
Otis filed its answer setting forth all the required information,
including detailed schedules showing the names and last known addresses of the record owners of all unclaimed personal property in its
custody together with the nature and amounts of such property. It also
set up defenses relating to the jurisdiction of the court, the constitutionality of the Act and the applicability of the statute of limitations.
According to the answer, the bulk of the unclaimed personal property consisted of stock, as to part of which a claim of ownership was
asserted by a litigant named Grenthal later in the suit. Otis, not pressing
the various defenses it had raised, did not contest the State's claim.
Grenthal did, however, and lost. The judgment of the trial court formally disallowed the Grenthal claim; declared that all personal property reported by Otis in its answer had escheated to the state and
directed that it be turned over to the state treasurer; discharged Otis of
all liability therewith; and directed the state treasurer to pay out of the
escheated property a counsel fee of $7,000 plus costs to the attorney who
had prosecuted for the State.
Otis' application for an allowance of counsel fees and disbursements
was denied. In its opinion 73 explaining its denial, the trial court noted
that Otis had relied on both the provisions of the Escheat Act 74 and the
"fund in court" provision of RULE 3:54-7(b). The court held that the
policy of the legislature as revealed in the statute was against an allowance of counsel fees or costs for a defendant in escheat, and that in view
of and in deference to this policy, while there was a "fund in court"
within the meaning of the Rule, it would use its discretion and deny
the application.
Otis appealed seeking a review of that denial. Grenthal also appealed from the judgment denying his claim. 75 Both he and the state
opposed Otis' application for counsel fees. Grenthal contended that the
provisions of the Escheat Act controlled the question of an allowance
in an escheat proceeding to the exclusion of rules of court. Escheated
property, he argued in effect, was a matter of state revenue, a branch of
State v. Otis Elevator Co., 19 N.J. Super. 107, 111, 88 A.2d 20, 22 (Ch. 1952).
Specifically, on N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:53-23 (now N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-21 (1952)),
which provides that the State Treasurer shall pay the escheator 5 percent of the escheated
property
as a reward for having supplied the information and evidence upon which the
escheat has been successfully prosecuted and shall pay such other fees and costs
as the judgment shall direct. (emphasis added)
Otis relied on the underlined language.
75 He lost on appeal. State v. Otis Elevator Co., 10 N.J. 504, 92 A.2d 385 (1952).
73

74
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state finance and thus peculiarly within the sole province of the legislature. Any rule of court which had as its effect the award of state
moneys was in violation of
"that very salutary rule of law prescribing interference by the judiciary with the fiscal policies of the government committed by the
Constitution to the legislative branch of our government."'76
He argued further that
where the Legislature has set up a complete system, in detail, including procedure operating in a limited area, and under restricted
circumstances in the fiscal or tax fields, the Courts have no77 right
or power to contravene the legislative mandate or intention.
This was rather a bold argument, a statement for legislative supremacy in fiscal matters, a position involving the separation of powers
which, in other contexts, the court had given recognition and respect
before Otis and since.78 At no point did Grenthal argue that a counsel
fee allowance was a matter of substantive law rather than procedural.
Nor did the State. Less bold than Grenthal, the State preferred to
follow the opinion of the trial court, favoring a deference to the statutory policy for reasons not stated but presumably set forth in the
79
Grenthal brief.
As for Otis, its brief placed its main reliance on the Rule, on the
theory of a "fund in court," although it did not completely abandon the
statute. And it rather pointedly reminded the parties and the court of
the words of Chief Justice Vanderbilt in an earlier case that" 'the allowance of fees is a matter of procedure governed by rule of court.' "so
Grenthal's argument, it turned out, convinced two Justices, Heher
76 Brief for Grenthal at 12, 258 BRIEFS OF NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT (quoting from
Jersey City v. Kelly, 134 N.J.L. 239, 248, 47 A.2d 354, 358 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946)).
77 Id.

78 Before: Jersey City v. Kelly, 134 N.J.L. 239, 47 A.2d 354 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946).
Since: East Orange v. Palmer, 52 N.J. 329, 337, 245 A.2d 327, 331 (1968), modifying 47 N.J.
307, 329-30, 220 A.2d 679, 692 (1966); Amantia v. Cantwell, 89 N.J. Super. 7, 213 A.2d 251
(App. Div. 1965) (involving the doctrine of sovereign immunity). But see P, T & L Constr.
Co. v. Comm'r, Dept. of Transp., 55 N.J. 341, 262 A.2d 195 (1970), wherein the court held
that it would no longer recognize the state's defense of sovereign immunity from suit in
actions on contract. Thereafter, in Willis v. Dep't of Conser. & Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264
A.2d 34 (1970), the court held that such a defense should not be recognized against any
tort claim arising after Dec. 31, 1970. The court reasoned in P, T & L that while the
"satisfaction of a favorable judgment would depend wholly upon the willingness of the
Legislature to accept the judgment and provide for payment," the courts should not be
closed to a suitor seeking a judgment of his claim. 55 N.J. at 346, 262 A.2d at 198.
79 See Brief for State of New Jersey, 258 BRIEFs OF NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT.
80 Brief for Otis Elevator Co. at 11, 258 BRIEFs OF NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT (quoting from Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 495, 86 A.2d 201, 231 (1952)).
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and Jacobs. But in siding with him, they colored his position with considerations of substance and procedure. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Jacobs suggested that the award of counsel fees in an escheat
proceeding
would hardly be a simple matter of practice as distinguished from
substantive right; at least it would present mixed elements of substantive right and procedure in a field which is of primary and
special legislative concern. 8'
Justice Heher, in his dissenting opinion, suggested that
the conditions attending the enforcement of the sovereign's right
of escheat and the proceedings to perfect the escheat are so intimately related to the substantive process as to be inseparable from
it. . . . [T]he conditions are of the substance, and not procedural
within the concept of the cited constitutional grant of authority
to the Supreme Court touching matters of practice and procedure.8 2
From this it will be seen that the statement of the Chief Justice
in his opinion-"This is the first case in which it has been contended
that counsel fees are a matter of substantive law 'ss -requires a good deal
of qualification. Such a contention was not raised by a party. And its
maintenance by the two dissenters was limited to the type of proceeding
at hand, an action for escheat.
No one in Otis then was contending that a counsel fee award in all
cases is a matter of substantive law. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice,
having erected his straw man, proceeded to knock him down:
From the outset in New Jersey, following English precedents, the
allowance of costs and counsel fees had been uniformly considered
by the courts of this State to be a matter of procedure rather than
of substantive law. Rader v. Southeasterly Road District, 36 N.J.L.
273 (Sup. Ct. 1873); Murphy v. [George] Brown & Co., 91 N.J.L.
412, [103 A. 28] (Sup. Ct. 1918); Igoe Brothers v. National Surety
Co., 112 N.J.L. 243, [169 A. 841] [Ct. Err. &App. 1934]; Robinson
v. Jackson, 14 N.J. Misc. 866, [187 A. 918] (C.P. 1936); Savitt v. L.
& F. Construction Co., 124 N.J.L. 173, [10 A.2d 728] [Ct. Err. 8c
App. 1940], affirming 123 N.J.L. 149, [8 A.2d 110] (Sup. Ct. 1939).84
81

12 N.J. at 24, 95 A.2d at 727 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).

82 Id. at 34, 95 A.2d at 732 (Heher, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 5, 95 A.2d at 717.
84 Id. The Chief Justice cannot be accurate in this statement as a matter of history.

In New Jersey at the outset, as in England, causes of action were pursued through the
forms of action. The distinction between "substance" and "procedure" had as yet not been
formulated. The great innovation in this respect as in so many others was suggested by
J. BENTHAM, first in the French language in TRAITtS DE L.CISLATION (1802), then in more
definitive form in a pamphlet in the English language, entitled SCOrCH REFORM (1808).
See ELIE HALVY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM 373-76, 545 (1949). The grad.
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Now since this "holding" in Otis has been a cornerstone in the supreme
court's construction of the entire law of counsel fees, we should briefly
consider the precedents upon which it relied.
Rader, the first case cited, did not at all involve counsel fees, but
rather the more limited entitlement to costs. The precise issue presented
was whether the loss of costs to plaintiff in an action abated due to the
enactment, during suit, of a statute providing for the dissolution of the
municipal corporate defendant and the substitution of another municipal corporation to answer for its contractual obligations, unconstitutionally deprived him of his remedy for enforcing his contract with
the defendant.8 5 The court thought not, since "the right to recover
costs is no part of the remedy which inheres in the contract. That
right is purely incidental ....,"6 In other words, costs is a remedy allowed for the expenditure of time and money pursuing one's contractual remedy, but is not a part of the latter remedy itself, and thus not
protected. The court said further that the right to costs does not vest
until judgment; any other view would be "unreasonable" and "impracticable." This would seem to follow from the minimal amounts at
stake. No reference was made to the categories of substantive law and
procedure.
(That costs is a remedy for liability for another's trial expenses was
87
more explicitly recognized in the recent case of State v. Mulvaney,
where the New Jersey Supreme Court vacated that part of a criminal
sentence imposing, in addition to a term in jail, costs in the sum of
$16,750, representing one-fourth of the state's trial expenses. The "authority to originate a liability for costs," it held, rests in the legislature
and the legislature had made no such provision.)
The remainder of the cited cases did involve counsel fees, but in
ual infiltration of these Benthamite distinctions through American jurisprudence took
place during the course of the 19th century, particularly the second half, and the 20th
century.
85 N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 7,
3 (1844) provided:
The legislature shall not pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for
enforcing a contract which existed when the contract was made.
For the distinction between impairment of obligation of contract and deprivation of
remedy for enforcing the contract and the reason for the inclusion of the latter provision,
not included in the United States Constitution, see Rader.
86 36 N.J.L. at 282; cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950), where the practical difficulties and costs involved in giving notice to persons missing or unknown in a proceeding affecting their property rights bore significantly on the
type of notice necessarily employed under the due process provision of the federal constitution. De minimis lex non curat.
87 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972).
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almost all of them the critical issue was whether such an allowance,
when authorized by statute, constituted an impairment of contract in
violation of state and federal constitutions.
In Murphy, the specific issue was whether an amendment to the
Workmen's Compensation Act had impaired a contract for hire in
providing for the payment of an employee's counsel fees in a compensation proceeding, when applied to the case of an employee hired after
the effective date of the amendment. The court there held that even
had the hiring preceded the effective date of the amendment, the provision in question
introduces no change whatever in the substantive terms of the
contract of employment, but merely amplifies the remedy and procedure by which that contract is to be enforced.88
It would have been more accurate to state, as implied in Rader,
that allowances are made not in compensation for the substantive
wrong giving rise to the litigation, but for the additional expense incurred in pursuit of the remedy for the substantive wrong. They affect
the defendant as suitor, not as employer. The use of the term "procedure" in this context is misleading.
The Igoe case, the third in the Vanderbilt line of citations, presented a more difficult problem, that of apparent retroactivity of statutory application. The question there decided was whether an amendment to a statutory bond scheme rendering the surety liable for counsel
fees in a suit on the bond, would, if applied in a case commenced after
the effective date of the amendment on a claim arising before such date,
constitute an impairment of the surety's contractual obligation. It
would seem that the statutory amendment had not impaired the contractual obligation set forth in the bond or affected it in any manner.
It did, however, affect the defendant, not as surety but as suitor, imposing upon him, after the action's commencement, a duty he did not
have at the beginning. Considerations of fairness and due process might
suggest a limitation as to its operation with regard to services performed
before its enactment. The court, however, foregoing analysis and relying on inappropriate authority, 9 upheld the statute and allowed the
counsel fee without limitation as involving only a matter of procedure.
The next case, Robinson v. Jackson, a trial court decision, followed
Igoe to the point of absurdity. It held that a statutory amendment allow88 91 N.J.L. at 416, 103 A. at 30.
89 Such as the textual statement in CoRPus Jusus and the supposed precedents of
Rader, and Lew v. Bray, 81 Conn. 213, 70 A. 628 (1908),

propriety of an allowance of costs, not counsel fees.

both of which involved the
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ing an award of counsel fees in a workman's compensation proceeding
in the old court of common pleas, upon remand from the old court
of errors and appeals, for services rendered on appeal in the latter court,
applied as "procedural" to a case decided in errors and appeals before
the effective date of the amendment. Of course, this was erroneous not
because by so doing it impaired the obligation of defendant's employment contract, but because it imposed upon him a legislative duty as
suitor not in existence at the time of the appeal. It is the due process
clause, not the contract clause, which is offended.
Finally, the Savitt case dealt with a statutory provision that required an employee to deduct from his workmen's compensation award
the amount of a prior recovery from a third party charged with negligence, but allowed him a set-off against the deduction in the amount
paid to his attorney for services rendered in the third party matter.
The court held that this constituted neither an impairment of contractual obligations nor a denial of due process. In this, the court was quite
correct. Quite clearly if the legislature saw fit to allow the employer
a credit in this connection, it could do so in terms of the employee's net
recovery from the third party rather than his gross. But the court was
quite clearly wrong in following what it considered to be the holding
in Igoe "that statutes regulating fees and costs are remedial or procedural in nature only and therefore not unconstitutional as impairing
the obligation of contract." In this context, the counsel fee is not a
matter of judicial allowance and hence not even a matter of remedy,
let alone one of procedure. What was involved was only the substantive
rights of the respective parties: the quantum of the credit.
Savitt, like all the other cases, with the exception of Rader-and
Rader is not in point-ran shy of analysis, taking refuge in what it
considered the safety of authoritative precedent and of such comfortable categories as "remedy and procedure." In the days when those cases
were being decided, this was the easy way out for a court caught in the
middle between the manufacturing, mercantile and money classes clamoring on the right for the freedom of contract, 90 the laboring and intellectual classes on the left demanding regulation and control, and
subject to review from above by a United States Supreme Court intent
90 "Freedom of contract" in employment cases was used in state litigation to strike
down state legislative reforms, first in New York, starting in 1885, then in Pennsylvania.
A. M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: Attitudes of Bar and Bench,

1887-1895, at 45-54 (1960). According to Paul, the courts' concern, federal and state, in this
freedom peaked in 1895, flagged somewhat during the Progressive Era, 1900-1920, quickened again in the era of "normalcy," 1920-1935, and finally disappeared after the crisis in
the United States Supreme Court in the late 1930's. Id. at 227-29.
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on honoring the contract clause of the federal constitution. Instinct
moved the courts in these cases to protect the statutes in question and
the contract clause. It is not in their holdings that Murphy, Igoe and
Savitt erred (as we have noted, Rader is not in point and Robinson did
err), but in their reasoning. Unfortunately, it was not for their holdings that Otis cited these cases, but for their reasoning. Wary of the
sting of the contract clause and apparently unable to distinguish either
between a person's conduct as defendant-suitor and his pre-litigation
conduct as contractor, or between the categories of substance, remedy
or procedure, they sometimes justified the various allowances for
counsel fees as pertaining to remedy or procedure, sometimes to procedure only. This reasoning should not be followed.
Moreover, though the court in Otis attempted to do so, this reasoning cannot be followed. We shall pursue the court through its later
decisions and see and judge how well the court is able to live with its
holding in Otis: that counsel fee allowances are a matter of practice
and procedure. It will shortly become clear that the court's position is
wholly untenable.
The Radical Amendment of Rule 3:54-7
In Liberty Title, decided December 4, 1950, the supreme court had
held that the power of the trial court to allow a fee to counsel was not
a matter for the sound judgment of that court (nor one of substantive
law, it was later held in Otis) but one within its exclusive rule-making
power as pertaining to procedure. Nor was such a matter one for legislative authorization. Three days after the decision in Liberty Title, it
amended RULE 3:54-7, the rule on counsel fees, by deleting in paragraph (d) the phrase, "by law," 91 thereby authorizing only such allowances as were specifically set forth or incorporated in the rules; and
casting into invalidity, by force of Winberry, all unsanctioned legislative provisions, past or future.
Prior to this, in the year 1950, the court, it will be recalled, had
vacillated on the question of legislatively authorized allowances and the
content to be given the phrase "by law" in paragraph (d). In January
of that year it had held in Westervelt's that such authorizations in
existence at the time of the adoption of the Rule in September 1948 had
been thereby repealed; the phrase would operate "in futuro" only,
92
despite the language to the contrary in the Tentative Draft Comment.
Then in Katz v. Farber, decided in April, it had declared an implied
91 73 N.J.L.J. 424 (1950). At the same time, paragraph (c) of the Rule was also
amended to make it applicable to all mortgage foreclosures, contested or uncontested. Id.
at 419.
92 3 N.J. 472, 70 A.2d 767 (1950).

1972]

COUNSEL FEES

retraction: the phrase meant only a supersession of statutory authorization to award counsel fees generally, but not of the various specific statutory authorizations.9 3 Then, perhaps driven by the incongruity of
tolerating any number of legislative specifics while prohibiting the
principle of a general legislative enablement, it did by the amendment
of December 7, 1950, "supersede statutory provisions then extant" and
"in futuro" as well.
The court would rule alone. But how was it ruling? Not very well
to date. Aside from the internal inadequacies of and contradictions in
the Rule itself, we have seen the court in a period of eleven months,
from January through early December, 1950, shift its position on three
different occasions in three different ways on the question of the incorporation in the Rule of statutory provisions: in Westervelt's in January,
in futuro only; in Farberin April, both past and future; and by the
amendment of December 7, neither past nor future. These shifts not
only involved the basic constitutional arrangements as to the power to
authorize counsel fee allowances, they also threw the law of such
allowances into vacillating disarray. For by Westervelt's, the status of
existing specific statutory authorizations of allowances, as in the cases
of an unclaimed deposit in chancery, of partition, of an application for
use of a veteran's surplus income, or of a corporate stockholder's suit,
were cast into doubt. By Farber, they were once again in. And by the
amendment of December 7, they were once again out, this time apparently definitely.
Aside from considerations of power, what were the basic policy
factors that could possibly account for these extraordinary shifts in
regulation? The court did not say. The rule as stated, it would seem,
was enough. Reasons and underlying policies were unannounced, considerations of consistency internal or otherwise apparently disregarded.
But when a court in the formulation of its rules forgets logical
consistency, eschews reasons and explanations, it has ceased to act like
a court but instead is acting as a legislature.
Judicial legislation aims to a far greater extent than do enactments
passed by Parliament, at the maintenance of the logic or the symmetry of the law. The main employment of a Court is the application of well-known legal principles to the solution of given cases,
and the deduction from these principles of their fair logical result.
Men trained in and for this kind of employment acquire a logical
conscience; they come to care greatly-in some cases excessively94
for consistency.
It is true that in speaking of judicial legislation, Dicey was referring to
93

4 N.J. 333, 72 A.2d 862 (1950).

94 A. DICEY, LAw & PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND

362 (1905).
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the power of a court employed in the decision of cases, not in the
formulation of rules of law in advance of their operation. But it is
also true that in empowering a court to legislate prospectively through
the rule-making power, it was not expected that the court so empowered would abandon its usual method of operation.
Yet of the New Jersey Supreme Court following the decision in
Winberry, it was probably not realistic to expect that it would continue
to act otherwise. After all, it was not only by virtue of the constitution
of 1947, as construed therein, the exclusive maker of rules regarding
practice and procedure. It was by virtue of its placement at the apex
of the adjudicatory system, the unreviewable judge of whether in a
given instance one of its own rules purportedly regulating a matter of
practice and procedure was or was not within its own rule-making
power.
So placed, the court would be in law unaccountable. So placed, as
we are about to see, the court in fact would fashion for itself a new
process for the resolution of controversies confronting it. For want of
a better name, this new and original method of operation may be called
the process of procedure. Its characteristics are severity alternating with
relaxation, rules suddenly decreed, succeeded in time or accompanied
at the same time by contradictory directives and qualifications, of reasons of state given by way of explanation instead of reasons in law, of
decisions in difficult cases seemingly designated to "honor" the rulemaking power system instead of accomplishing justice. They are the
characteristics of the unfailing one-party system.
In the creation of this one-party system, the subject of counsel
fees played a crucial part. In the development of this system, counsel
fees has continued to play a crucial part, driving the court further and
further into error, deeper and deeper into inconsistency, illogicality and
excess. It all began even before the court officially began, in those
crowded days before September, 1948, when the new rules were being
formulated, with the precipitous judgment to restrict the award of
counsel fee allowances in the trial court by rule as a matter of practice
and procedure. It culminated in the momentous decisions of December,
1950, that the problem at hand was one simply handled by the court in
the Rule, without the aid of the legislature (by deletion of the phrase,
"by law"), or of the trial courts (as held in Liberty Title).
A vacuum had been created.95 All further discussions would pro95 For the relationship between absolute government and the process of decisionmaking in that type of government, see E. BARKER, REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT 197-98
(1948).
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ceed within the limits of the court's own formulae, as set forth in the
rules. But as' the court would find out, the topic of counsel fees was not
so simple. Yet confronted with its problems, it would find itself alone
in the vacuum of its own making, without collaborators, beyond review,
compelled to temporize by dint of trial and error, retracing the path
of its original mistake ever so slowly, that error may not seem too
obvious. Finally, it would lead not to the point of departure, for that
would mean the abandonment of the system, but in a new direction,
wherein the court will mix not only the realms of substance and remedy
and procedure, but those, as well, of the administration of the courts
and the administration of justice. By a new rule, the court will not only
create a new cause of action for every case. It will use this new creation
as a "procedural mechanism" to help it solve the problem of calendar
congestion. Not only will total progress be slow, but matters will in
this absolute rule-making state get progressively worse.
IV.

VANDERBILT'S

COURT CONSTRUES

THE RULE

Preliminary Remarks
In the previous section, we were concerned with the constitutional
question: who in New Jersey is authorized to regulate the allowance
of counsel fees in the trial courts of the state? That decided, we turn
in this section to a study of the scope of authorization prescribed by
the supreme court. At the start of 1951, the law in New Jersey regarding
counsel fees was apparently simple. You looked at RULE 3:54-7 and read
that no fee was allowable except: (a) in matrimonial actions; (b) out of
a "fund in court"; (c) in uncontested foreclosures; and (d) as provided
elsewhere in and by the rules of court. On January 1, 1952,6 a paragraph
(e) was added, permitting a fee in an action for probate of will or
codicil. The reach of this new provision will be discussed in a few pages.
The apparent simplicity of the rule was deceptive. For one thing,
it developed that "fund in court," as used in the rule, was a phrase
of art. There might be moneys actually in court and yet be no "fund";
and then there might be a "fund" where there were no moneys in court.
For another, in the case of a moneylender seeking to protect itself in
advance against the costs of collection by the inclusion in the bond
of a provision for the debtor's payment of its attorney's fee in the event
of suit, the demands of contract would embarrass the rules of procedure.
Thirdly, the various rules of procedure might authorize allowances
96 75 N.J.L.J. 9 et seq. (1952). For a more detailed discussion of-this amendment, see
note 112 infra.
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to justify on principles of fairness. Fourthly, traditional causes,
the cause for malicious prosecution, or exigent circumstances,
a tardy application for trial adjournment, might require, in
the Rule, that an allowance be made.

Paragraph (b)-"fund in court"-Construed
9 7 the court attempted an explanation of the
In Katz v. Farber,
phrase, "fund in court," but one productive of such confusion and
subsequent litigation as to require from the court a later "explanation '9 8 omitting much of the content of the original. But since the confusion is instructive in a study of the process of procedural rule-making,
the explanation originally afforded should be considered in some detail.
The dispute actually was between the Farbers. They had signed a
contract to sell to Katz the realty Farber had acquired before the marriage. When Mrs. Farber refused to sign the deed, Katz sued in the
chancery division of the superior court for specific performance. Pursuant to a consent order, the Farbers signed and delivered the deed to
Katz and he deposited with the clerk of the court the unpaid balance
due under the contract, subject to the respective rights of the Farbers.
Farber thereupon filed a petition for leave to withdraw from the
fund so much as belonged to him outright, the remainder, such as the
court might find should be held to answer the inchoate dower of Mrs.
Farber, to be retained in court. Mrs. Farber cross-petitioned that the
value of her inchoate right of dower be paid to her forthwith, basing
her claim on an alleged oral contract with Farber which he denied
making. The court found that Mrs. Farber failed to prove the contract
and dismissed her petition. It permitted Farber to withdraw about
one-half of the proceeds and impounded the balance in court to insure
the payment of the appropriate income to Mrs. Farber if and when
her dower should become consummate, the income therefrom in the
meantime to be paid to the husband. It further found it was without
present power to value the inchoate right of dower or to make an
allowance to her of counsel fees. She appealed and the case was certified
to the supreme court, which affirmed both on the merits and on the
disallowance of a counsel fee.
In a somewhat rambling fashion the court discussed the meaning
of the phrase, "fund in court." It noted that it had been held in Universal Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Caltagirone9 that a sum deposited
97 4 N.J. 33, 72 A.2d 862 (1950).
98 Sunset Beach Amusement Corp. v. Belk, 33 N.J. 162, 162 A.2d 834 (1960), to be discussed at length infra.
99 119 N.J. Eq. 491, 182 A. 862 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936).
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in chancery in a suit to enjoin proceedings in execution of a prior
judgment at law as security for the payment of such judgment, was not
"the subject of the then pending litigation" and consequently not a
fund in court for the purposes of an allowance for counsel fee. Thus,
summarized the court, there may be a fund "when the money is actually
in the custody of the court and is the subject of the litigation." 10 0 This
we shall hereafter refer to as the Caltagironeor subject-of-litigation line
of case, even though in Caltagironethe fund in question was held not
to have been the subject of litigation.
Next, the court included within the term, "fund in court," cases
involving the administration of trusts or estates. Thus, an accounting
"figuratively brings [the] fund into the court," authorizing an allowance for the fiduciary. Third, it included as a "fund" the property of an
infant or incompetent preserved or recovered through the intercession
of a next friend. This, the court said, was absolutely essential for their
safety and security.
Finally, the court included "by analogy" the case of a class suitor
who, as in Cintas v. American Car & Foundry Co.,' 0 ' produces or protects a fund for the benefit of a class. This it considered a trust fund
out of which, in good conscience, the costs of the class suitor should be
paid in the form of an allowance for counsel fees.
In sum then, the court seemed to find a fund, within the meaning
of the Rule, wherever there was a trust fund, whether actual, constructive or by way of analogy, or where there were moneys deposited
in court, the subject of litigation.
The court then turned to the matter at hand, the dispute between
the Farbers. It held there to be no fund in court so long as the wife's
interest was actually a right of inchoate dower in the realty. But it
added that the parties, by consent, had deposited money in court
subject to the rules of court. This money, it held
was not only in the custody of the court, it was the subject of the
pending litigation. We regard the deposit as a fund in court against
which an allowance for counsel 102
fee could be made in the discretion
of the court in proper instance.
But upon the merits of the application, it agreed with the trial court
that the allowance should be denied.
The court thus followed Caltagironeboth in its formulation of the
100 4 N.J. at 344, 72 A.2d at 868.
101 133 N.J. Eq. 301, 32 A.2d 90 (Ch. 1943).
102

4 N.J. at 344-45, 72 A.2d at 868.
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rule that there can be a fund where there is a money deposit actually
in court and the subject of litigation, and in its denial of an allowance
to the applicant. It was this holding which gave the court so much trouble in the following years until, diplomatically, it denied it had ever
103
so held.
It will have been noted that the court gave reasons of social utility
as the basis for an allowance out of a trust fund. For in the case of an
incompetent or of a trust or estate administration, who would come
forth to serve if he had to pay the expense of an accounting out of his
own pocket? The allowance in the class action it had rested on other
grounds, on "good conscience," that everyone should bear his fair share.
But as to an allowance in a Caltagironeor Farber situation, it assigned
no reason, nor did it point out that in either case no allowance had in
fact been made.
Most of the subsequent litigation concerning counsel fee allowances was based on these two kinds of fund. The one, where there
were actually moneys in court, the subject of litigation, counsel, relying
on what Farber had said and held, would seek an allowance out of
moneys so deposited and the court would usually deny them. The
other, where counsel, regardless of the presence of moneys in court,
would seek the determination of a trust fund and an allowance therefrom, sometimes the court would say yes, sometimes, no.
Let us consider the trust fund cases first, since they are the easier;
next, the subject-of-litigation cases; and then the cases of the successful
litigant unsuccessfully in search of a "fund" according to Farber.This
will lead us to some basic considerations regarding the fashioning of
remedies and the formulation of unaccountable exceptions.
The trust fund cases. From the very first case under consideration,
Milberg v. Seaboard Trust Co., 04 a judicial attitude emerges which we
will see in later cases forming into a pattern: a disinclination to discuss
the facts of the matter before the court bearing on the decision for
allowance or disallowance or to examine with care, and with an eye for
comparison, the relevant precedents or to explain the basis for decision.
The facts in Milberg were these: Seaboard was in'the process of
dissolution; each of its shareholders was, under an announced plan of
sale, to receive a certain named price. Fanny Milberg and the City of
Hoboken, shareholders, considering the price insufficient sued to enjoin
the sale. Defendants offered in the pleadings to pay into court a sum
103 See note 98 supra.
104

7 N.J. 236, 81 A.2d 142 (1951).
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certain, presumably the total of the as yet unsurrendered stock at the
price set forth in the plan under attack. The plaintiffs accepted the offer
on condition that their acceptance would not limit the defendants'
liability, if any, to pay into court such other sums as might be
determined by the court to be a fair value of the stock outstanding. 105
The plaintiffs, by order, were designated as representing all owners of
stock, being several hundred persons, who as yet had not surrendered
their stock.
The lower court characterized the issues of valuation as important
and complex. Nevertheless, plaintiffs lost; the injunction was denied.
Yet although they had failed in their attempt to create a fund-more
money-their counsel received an allowance. And the supreme court
affirmed, on the authority of Cintas.
In Cintas, however, the stockholder receiving the allowance had
been a successful suitor. Representing the preferred stockholders, he
had obtained a decree restraining his corporation, the defendant, from
paying a proposed dividend to common stockholders out of moneys
as to which the preferred had prior rights. In Milberg, the plaintiffs
were unsuccessful. Thus, what constituted the "fund"? Milberg, purporting to follow Cintas, in fact went beyond it:
We think in the case sub judice the money so deposited constituted a fund in the court, the administration of which was under
the jurisdiction of the court for the benefit and protection of a
particular class, payable to the members thereof proportionately to
their respective shares,
and the allowances made were within the
00
sanction of our rule.'
But members of the class would have gotten this fund anyway. As to
this and for this, plaintiffs had done nothing. Nor does it fall within
the precedent set forth in Caltagirone,because the funds deposited were
not the subject of litigation.
Thus, Milberg, going beyond Farber and Cintas, stands for the
proposition that one gets a fee not out of the fund one is seeking to
create or preserve but rather out of a fund that all litigants are in
agreement as to its ownership. It is somewhat like the case of the next
friend suing the government official for dissipation of a part of an
Indian's property, losing, and yet receiving an allowance out of the
Indian's remaining property, provided he had acted in good faith and
105 Id. at 245, 81 A.2d at 146.
106 Id. at 245, 81 A.2d at 147.
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with reasonable expectations of success.' If this is so, the reason for
the rule lies in the desire to encourage those who would protect the
needy, rather than in considerations of unjust enrichment underlying
Cintas. Members of a class are not exactly children or incompetents,
but practically speaking, their individual interests are often not substantial enough to permit them to litigate as individuals. Thus the class
suit affords them an opportunity to advance their claims they would
not otherwise have. Since they stand to gain if the class is successful,
it is only proper that each should bear his fair share of the risk of litigation if unsuccessful, provided the court finds the claim asserted on
their behalf was meritorious and competently presented.
But this the court did not say. In its view, the presence in court of
the fund bearing the burden of payment was not a convenient accident
but the very heart of the matter. From this, one might get the impression that the court really did not know what it was doing in allowing a fee out of a "fund in court"; whom it was protecting, or why. This
impression is not dispelled in the following cases. The first of these is
In re Koretzky. 0 8
There the trial court, after denying a petition of the chief beneficiary of an estate for the removal of the executors, denied the beneficiary's request for counsel fees on the basis of lack of authority. On
appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding that the executors were
derelict and the plaintiff was entitled to a counsel fee. In one sentence
the court disposed of the problem of the lower court's power:
That there was "fund in court" is apparent, for the action of the
plaintiff in seeking the removal of the executors was for the protection of the estate. 109
This was certainly sensible. In this context it is the entire estate which
constitutes the fund to be protected. Thus an allowance to the moving
party spreads the expense of the litigation among all the beneficiaries
of the estate in proportion to their holdings; as in Cintas, where the
cost of suit was spread among all the successful preferred shareholders.
But the trial court had doubted its power. A more than onesentence rationale seemed in order. Yet the court seemed to prefer
brevity to explication. Perhaps in part the lower court was confused as
to the practice to be followed generally in estate matters. If so, this is
107 This would be in line with the old New Jersey equity rule set forth in Voorhees
v. Polhemus, 36 N.J. Eq. 456, 458 (Ch. 1883) which allowed an allowance to the next friend
to an incompetent even though unsuccessful, though in that case entitlement was limited
to the "taxed costs of the action," no mention being made of counsel fees.
108

8 N.J. 506, 86 A.2d 238 (1951).

109 Id.

at 531, 86 A.2d at 250.
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not surprising. Consider, for example, the decision in the following
year in Ferguson v. Rippel,11° where in a will construction case a fee
was approved as to all worthy participants, as out of a "fund in court,"
because there was a reasonable doubt and uncertainty as to the language
under construction. Presumably, the fund in this instance constitutes
the sum of the assets whose ownership or distribution is in dispute and
therefore under construction, and not necessarily the entire estate. But
the allowance is not confined to all who share in the victory. Even the
losers, provided they were worthy participants, i.e., arguing a meritorious question, also get an allowance. As to this, there would seem no
adequate basis in precedent. The court suggested that the matter involved the administration of a trust and thus came under the cover of
Katz v. Farber.In this view, an executor or testamentary trustee is entitled to a fee not out of considerations of unjust enrichment (as in
Koretzky and Cintas), but for another reason mentioned in our discussion of Farber: the practical need to reimburse a fiduciary for expenses to insure that people will be available to perform these arduous
duties. But this reason does not apply to the contesting beneficiaries.
Of course, one could say that the assets of the estate are in the custody
of the court, that they constitute the subject of litigation, and hence
under Caltagirone, they constitute a "fund in court." Indeed, this was
the basis assigned for such an award in the Cintas case."' But the court
in Ferguson did not rely on this basis. Had it done so, it might have had
110 23 N.J. Super. 132, 142, 92 A.2d 647, 652-53 (App. Div. 1952), cert. denied, 11 N.J.
329, 94 A.2d 548 (1953). Actually in Ferguson no allowance was made because the language
under construction was unambiguous. This case was thereafter cited with approval by the
supreme court in Sunset Beach Amusement Corp. v. Belk, 33 N.J. 162, 162 A.2d 834 (1960),
which will be discussed in detail infra. (The irony of this will appear later.) See also 5 A.
CLAs', N.J. PRAcrr-cE § 296, at 564 (1962).
Ferguson based its authority on Katz, but that case did not mention an action for
will or trust construction; and on the case of In re Purcell, 125 N.J. Eq. 372, 6 A.2d 137
(Prerog. 1939) in the former practice; but there the court, in approving the power of the
old orphans' court to allow a counsel fee in a will construction arising out of distribution,
had made it clear that such power was based on the Law of June 14, 1898, ch. 234, § 196,
[1898] N.J. Laws 788 (repealed 1951), authorizing allowances in "causes litigated in the
court." That statute had, of course, died by virtue of the deletion of the words "by law"
from the rule governing counsel fees in December 1950. See material cited note 91 supra
and accompanying text.
111 133 N.J. Eq. at 304, 32 A.2d at 92, where the court said that in
a suit to construe a will or a trust agreement. . . . [I]t is common practice to
award counsel fees out of the decedent's estate or the trust fund, neither of
which is in court, but is the subject-matter of the litigation and for that reason
under the control of the court.
But cf. West v. St. James' Episcopal Church, 83 N.J. Eq. 324, 325, 91 A. 101, 101 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1914), wherein it was stated that costs should not be awarded to an unsuccessful
claimant in a suit to recover part of the estate.
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to explain the grounds in utility or in conscience for deviating from
the usual policy that litigants ordinarily will be expected to bear the
burden of suit themselves.
While on the subject of estates, we should consider the terms of
the already-mentioned paragraph (e) of the rule on counsel fees added
in 1952, governing allowances in an action for probate of will or codicil.
Paragraph (e) provided as follows:
If probate is refused, the court in its discretion may make an allowance to be paid by the proponent of the will or codicil, or out of
the estate of the decedent. If probate is granted, the court may
make an allowance to be paid by the contestant, but if it shall appear that the contestant had reasonable cause for contesting the
validity of the will or codicil, the court may make an allowance to
both the proponent and the contestant, to be paid out of the
estate. 12
The Rule as written presented some difficulties. In the event of
a grant of probate, there was, by its terms, an express authorization of
an allowance for both the proponent and the contestant. Not so in
the case of a refusal of probate. There, the Rule stated only that there
may be an allowance. It did not state to whom the allowance may be
made. In addition, while in either case-that of a grant or refusal of
probate-the court had the choice of imposing the allowance either
on the losing party or on the estate, the basis for the decision was,
unaccountably, differently stated. Thus, in the case of a grant, the
burden is shifted from the losing contestant in whole or in part to the
estate "if it shall appear that the contestant had reasonable cause for
contesting the validity of the will or codicil." While in the case of a
refusal, the burden is shifted from the losing proponent-whether in
whole or in part is not, as we have just noted, stated-simply "in its
[the trial court's] discretion." Such shifts in phraseology could only lead
in practice to nonuniformity and to needless litigation in search of a
more precise construction.
But meaning aside, what are the bases for such provisions? Presumably, in the case of a refusal, the provision for an allowance out of
the estate is based on a policy of encouragement for proponents, as long
L12 Clapp states that the rule was derived from the provisions of the Law of June
14, 1898, ch. 234, § 197, [1898] N.J. Laws 789 (repealed 1951). 7 A. CLAPP, N.J. PRAcricE
§ 1548, at 271 n.8 (1962). Clapp was Senator in charge of the revision of Titles 2 and 3 in
the N.J. Legislature. The former statute, he notes, used the words "expenses of the litigation" and these words were construed so as to include counsel fees, whether the application
for the fee arose on the grant or denial of probate.
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as the claim advanced be meritorious although not necessarily successful, to the end that a decedent's testamentary dispositions be carried
out. An allowance to the contestant from such a source would relieve
the proponent of a burden. Any allowance to the proponent would
be akin to an award for an unsuccessful next friend to one in need,
such as a minor or incompetent. But in authorizing the fee to be assessed against the proponent, the Rule has apparently chosen upon the
policy of burdening the loser, as a defeated adversary, with all the
expenses, presumably in a case of bad faith. In that case, the allowance
is employed as a device to discourage fruitless litigation. Similarly, if
probate is granted, there are the same alternate policies for encouraging
or discouraging contests, the policy to be invoked depending upon the
court's assessment of the merits of defense.
It would appear then that by the formal amendment to the Rule
under paragraph (e), the court has, in an action contesting an offer of
will or codicil, permitted the imposition of an allowance in favor of
one party to be assessed against the estate involved or the other party in
what amounts to an adversary situation, apparently basing such allowance in the latter case on what amounts to bad faith. Just as in an
action for construction of a will, it has permitted, by virtue of the
construction of the "fund in court" provision of paragraph (b) in
Ferguson, an allowance in favor of all worthy participants out of the
estate. This amounts, insofar as the nonfiduciary parties are concerned,
to an adversary situation, provided these participants have (in effect)
acted in good faith by presenting a meritorious argument.
In either case, one would like to get from the court a statement as
to the nature of the interests being protected, the equities-if the word
may be used-in their favor. One would like to know what is so special
about litigants in will construction suits that their burdens are made
lighter; and what is so sinister about will contestants that they alone
are subject, in a case of bad faith, to payment of their adversary's counsel fees. One would like further to know why the subject of the will
contest becomes the matter for formal amendment and why the subject
of will construction has been allowed to be merged with, and submerged by, the formidable case law on the "fund in court." Again, one
would like to know why one provision for an allowance in estate
practice appears in paragraph (b) and another in paragraph (e), even
though the underlying principles governing their allowance appear
to be the same or similar when made out of the estate involved. And
why, one would like to know, has the court not disposed of these allow-
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ances imposed upon the estate under the precedential statements of
Caltagirone, Cintas and Farber?In short, one would like to have from
the court some statement evidencing a comprehensive plan.
Thus, one gets the feeling that the emerging law of counsel fees
was following no discernible pattern. The next cases, also concerning
the provision for "fund in court," the companion cases of Driscoll v.
Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co.,11 and Haines v. Burlington County
Bridge Commission,11 4 do little to dispel this feeling. The court, the
Chief Justice again writing the opinions, seems to have committed
serious error.
These are the facts. The Burlington Bridge Commission had
bought a pair of bridges and other assets from two privately owned
companies, paying more than $7,000,000 over its estimated value in
condemnation. Two taxpayers, Haines and another, brought suit to
rescind the purchase, joining the Commission and the selling syndicate.
They obtained temporary restraints and the appointment of a receiver
to take possession of and operate the bridges. Then the Governor and
Attorney General, starting a second action for rescission and obtaining
a stay of the Haines action, assumed management of the cause.
The story developed at the trial sheds some light on the remedies
finally awarded by the court. An enterprising syndicate, bent on raiding the treasury of Burlington County, had arranged the passage of a
statute where upon the purchase of interstate bridges a county bridge
commission would have an effective ten-mile radius monopoly of
river crossings. Thereafter, it arranged the purchase of two privately
owned Delaware River bridges at a price of about $4,000,000 over their
actual value. Then in a quickly moving scheme executed in the span
of a single day under its guidance, the Burlington County Bridge Commission was created and organized, adopted a pre-existing plan to
purchase the two bridges at a gross profit to the syndicate of approximately $3,000,000, and closed title. Within four additional days, the
purchase price in the form of Commission bonds had passed, through
the efforts of a fast-moving group of underwriters, into public circulation.
The trial court rescinded the sale, ordered the bridges restored
to the syndicate and ordered the latter to repay the Commission the
purchase price. It held the bondholders subrogated to the rights of
mortgage and other lien holders as of the closing date, and granted a
lien on all bridge revenues until the payment of the bonds, subject
113 8 N.J. 433, 86 A.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
114 8 N.J. 539, 86 A.2d 236 (1952).
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however, to the state's right to acquire the bridges. In the Driscoll case,
it allowed counsel fees in the sum of $50,000 to counsel for the plaintiffs, the Governor and the Attorney General, to be paid by the bridge
receivers out of money in their hands. In the companion case, it allowed to Haines and another a counsel fee of $27,500 to be paid by the
bridge commissioners out of its general funds.
On appeal, the supreme court modified the judgment. It held
that most of the bondholders, members of the underwriting group,
were holders in due course. Thus the bonds as issued were adjudged
by the supreme court to be liens on the revenue of the two bridges.
So long as the bridges remained in the hands of the bridge commission
they and their revenues were to be tax-exempt, but if restored to
private ownership, they would be subject to tax thus diverting funds
in substantial amounts from the bondholders. Rescission would therefore be inequitable to the bondholders. Instead of rescission, the purchase would stand, but the court would require the syndicate to account for their gross profits of some $3,000,000 and repay such amount
to the receivers. They would not be allowed to plead their expenses,
some $1,100,000. ("They are hoist with their own petard," chuckled
the Chief Justice. Hamlet could not have enjoyed the more the shaft
he shoved to Rosenkrantz and Gildenstern.) From this refund and from
the revenues coming into their hands the Commission should pay off
the bonds; and when paid, the bridges would become toll-free. Until
such time the bridges would not be subject to condemnation.
The court denied, however, the allowance of any counsel fee. In
Driscoll, counsel for the plaintiff had been retained as special counsel.
This the Chief Justice considered contrary to general legislative policy
against such retainers without specific legislative appropriation.1 1 This
position would in the court's own terms appear questionable. If, as
later held in State v. Otis Elevator Co., 116 it was to be beyond the competence of the legislature to enact statutes authorizing an allowance
of counsel fees, so ought it be beyond their competence to enact legislation affecting the denial of a counsel fee. If an allowance is a matter
of procedure, so also should be the denial of an allowance. And if, on
the other hand, under Driscoll, legislative policy has a significant bearing in denial of an allowance, it should have followed in Otis that such
policy should have a significant bearing in the granting of an allowance.
The court, as if anticipating this line of reasoning and yet reluctant
to yield the fruits of an opportunistic argument, shifted to other
115 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17A-19 (1970).

116 See extended discussion beginning at note 70 supra and accompanying text.
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grounds and denied the allowance as unauthorized under the rules.
Counsel in both cases had relied on Farber, Cintas, Milberg and
Trustees v. Greenough,117 a suit to preserve the assets of a trust fund
for the benefit of bondholders. But the court rejected the notion that
plaintiffs sought to create or preserve a fund. Rather they had sought to
rescind an illegal purchase made by a public body. True, as a result of
these proceedings, there were funds in the hands of the court-appointed
receiver, but not "funds in court" since the funds were not for the
benefit of the class for which the plaintiffs are the representatives but
for the benefit of the defendant bondholders whom the plaintiffs quite
obviously did not represent.
But why did not the fund of some $3,000,000, the gross profits to
be repaid by the selling syndicate to the public body which the plaintiffs did represent, constitute a "fund in court"? This sum was to be
used to pay off the bonds, and upon payment in full the bridges were
to be toll-free. To this considerable extent the public interest, for
which the plaintiffs had labored, would be benefited. The court did
not even consider that question. Instead it left the plaintiffs to their
own devices. To Van Riper in the Driscoll case, it suggested with some
irony that he apply to the legislature for a special appropriation, presumably in the face of the basic policy against such legislation which
the court had used against counsel. For Haines and his co-litigant it
had no suggestion. Presumably for them, to quote Shakespeare again,
virtue is its own reward.
It would appear, however, that a class representative who successfully achieves a rescission of an improvident purchase on the grounds
of fraud, saving thereby a diminution in assets of some $7,000,000,
minus the true value of the item purchased, is entitled to claim that
he has preserved a fund for the class. Is his case any different if, where
he sues in rescission and proves the fraud, the court gives him less
than the complete remedy he sought but grants him instead, by way
of reduction of the purchase price, a judgment of some $3,000,000? Half
the loaf should also constitute a "fund."
This does not appear to have been argued. Counsel apparently
looked to the toll collections as constituting the fund rather than the
purchase price to be restored in the event of a rescission.11s Even so,
the court should not have been misled. Or were some of the
plaintiffs so inextricably woven into the political texture of the case
that the Chief Justice decided they too ought to be "hoist with their
117 105 US. 527 (1882).
118 See briefs for plaintiffs, 142 BRIEFs OF NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT.
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own petard"? Whether or not the court was misled, its opinion is
misleading and hard to reconcile with the prior cases. If for pragmatic
and equitable reasons, a plaintiff who labors to create or preserve a
.fund for private parties is due an allowance of counsel fees, a plaintiff
laboring on behalf of public funds ought stand in no inferior position.
Not only are Driscoll and Haines hard to reconcile with the earlier
cases, they do not square with the later decision in State v. Otis Elevator
Co. We have already discussed one inconsistency between the cases;
there is another. For in Otis the court, having decided that counsel fees
were surely a matter of procedure, and that the legislature had no
special authority in the matter of finance so as to make laws regarding
a draft on the state revenues for payment of counsel fees, concluded
in favor of an allowance to the State for just such counsel fees on the
theory that the Attorney General had labored for a class, the people
of the State of New Jersey, to create or preserve a fund. Let us take a
second look at Otis.
It will be recalled from our prior view that the State and Otis
both had sought allowances in the trial court. That court, following
the escheat statute, had granted the State's application, but had denied
that of Otis; Otis appealed. No one contended before the supreme
court that the allowance to the State was invalid. But when the State
and Grenthal, a claimant to certain of the escheated property, argued
against an award to Otis on the basis of the provisions of the escheat
statute, the court had responded by destroying any statutory authority
for an allowance on the grounds that the statute dealt with procedure
in this respect rather than with substance thereby disposing of the
basis relied upon below for the allowance to the State. Therefore,
before it could turn to the Otis claim, the court would first have to
revive the award to the State, which it did-within the Rule.
The State had a right to counsel fees, the court held, because
there was a "fund in court." Chief Justice Vanderbilt explained:
[Ain escheat action is one by which the State comes into court seeking an accounting of property of which it is the residual owner and
a judgment as to its title thereto .... It is well recognized that in
an action such as this in the nature of an accounting the property
is brought within the control of the court and constitutes a "fund in
court" within the meaning of Rule 3:54-7(b).119
None of this seems necessary. Surely the State did not need an
order of court directing it to pay its own counsel his fee out of its
own property. Clients ordinarily settle their own bills with counsel
119 12 N.J. at 11-12, 95 A.2d at 720.
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without reference to the court. In fact, as far as the State was concerned, this was not a counsel fee case at all, "within the meaning of
Rule 3:54-7(b)." The State sought no reimbursement for its expenses
from anyone else, neither from its nominal adversary in the litigation
at hand nor from any nonparticipant. This is neither a Caltagironenor
a Cintas. Nor is it anything else; it is a mirage.
The statutory provision for a court order of allowance was really
a convenience, amounting to a settlement by court order of the fair
amount due counsel from his client. Since the client here is the state
and the type of action involved is an escheat proceeding, wherein
property involved is delivered over to the state, it is a service readily
performed. By anticipating disputes, it eliminates them.
Of course, in the ordinary case, i.e., one involving private parties,
in the absence of dispute, there would be no justiciable matter. 120 But
if there were a dispute, then the issue of the proper amount of counsel
fees could be decided. Thus a class could, in anticipation of litigation
seeking a judgment declaring its ownership in a fund, agree that
counsel in charge of such litigation be paid his fee out of such judgment. The court would honor such an agreement. Nor would the
agreement become offensive or invalid merely because it provided that
the court, after deciding the issue of ownership, should, in the event
of a dispute between class and counsel, declare the ancillary issue of
reasonable value of counsel's service and enter an order for that
amount payable out of the property declared to be the property of the
class. The court, it is true, might insist that a separate suit be filed,
although there is precedent that it is more proper to proceed in the
121
original cause by supplemental petition and order to show cause.
But this is incidental; the essential thing is that the court would enforce the agreement. Yet in Otis the court regarded an arrangement
along these lines invalid not for lack of an actual controversy-this
would have been grounds for nondecision, not for invalidity-but because instead of being set forth in an agreement, it was incorporated
in a statute.
But legal mirages, like legal fictions, may be useful to a court
intent on disguising the real thrust of its decision: to give effect to
the substance of a provision while denying its legal existence. Thus a
120

Cf. Sunset Beach Amusement Corp. v. Belk, 33 N.J. 162, 170, 162 A.2d 834, 838

(1960).
121 Artale v. Columbia Ins. Co., 109 N.J.L. 463, 467, 162 A. 585, 586-87 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1932) (cited in Sunset Beach Amusement Corp. v. Belk, 33 N.J. 162, 170, 162 A.2d
834, 838 (1960)).
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remedy for substantive rights is rendered procedure so that the court
rule may remain inviolate.
With Otis we are on different footing. Otis was held to be entitled
to an award, because under the Escheat Act the burden of listing the
personal property to be escheated and of describing it in great detail
is placed not upon the state but upon the defendant. It is a burden
of inquisition and proof that cannot be avoided by default because,
pursuant to statute, the trial court shall, as in this case, direct it to
furnish the information. And in the event a claim is made on the
property, the burden of proving the claims is by the statute shifted to
the claimant. Therefore, concluded the court:
In these circumstances the statute places the laboring oar in the
defendant's hands and without any wrongdoing on its part commands it to produce the appropriate proof that in the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings would come from the plaintiff. In
these circumstances it is only equitable that when it comes to the
allowance of counsel fees the defendant be given at least as favorable consideration as the State. 122
To use the formula of Cintas, the defendant, nominally the adversary
of the party seeking to create the fund, is in reality that party's helper
albeit the help is required of him by statute.
What is noteworthy is that the court, in permitting an allowance
in a novel, unprecedented situation, gave recognition in its opinion to
the basic equitable considerations underlying the allowance and went
so far as to give these considerations their proper name: "equitable."
Yet it was no accident that the court in the very same opinion held the
power of the trial judge to grant such an allowance to be a matter of
procedure. Consequently, the determination of which equitable considerations would form the basis for an allowance was for the supreme
court to determine in advance by rule, and thereafter by the courts
through the proper construction of the phraseology of that rule, rather
than for the trial court by simple reference to its own view of what is
equitable under all the circumstances of the case.
This kind of solution means in effect that the supreme court can
pick and choose when and where a set of equitable circumstances will
be so happy as to warrant an allowance. As Justice Jacobs, dissenting
in Otis, pointed out, a defendant required under the rules of discovery
to search out and make available to plaintiff records and testimony
bearing on plaintiff's claim is not recompensed by an allowance. This
122

12 N.J. at 21, 95 A.2d at 725 (emphasis added).
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is so even though it should be decided there had been no wrongdoing
on his part. Should the mere fortuity that the plaintiff sues not for
himself but as a class representative alter the case?
Other questions are suggested. Was it the force of the equitable
factors present that induced the Chief Justice to recognize the presence
of a fund? Or was it the provisions of the stricken statute which allowed to the escheator a fee of 5 percent
as a reward for having supplied the information and evidence upon
which the escheat has been successfully prosecuted and . . .such
123
other fees and costs as the judgment shall direct[?]

And what of a situation wherein the corporate defendant, unlike Otis,
actually contests the escheat? (Otis had raised certain legal defenses
but had abandoned them.) The Chief Justice considered this and went
off on another tack: should there be no reasonable justification for the
defense, a mere "show of legal activity," then "the court would be
justified either in denying a counsel fee altogether or even in assessing
the costs of the proceeding against it."124
In other words, the trial court, in square contradiction to the
holding in Liberty Title,125 can allow counsel fees not within the Rule,
not out of a "fund in court," but out of defendant's pockets. Non sub
126
lege, sed sub deo.
Thus, to sum up, in all respects the holdings and rationales in
Otis are unsatisfactory. After declaring the allowance of a counsel fee
to be a matter of procedure and the statutory scheme governing such
allowances to be unconstitutional, the court directed awards of such
fees to the State and to Otis (thus practically carrying out the statutory
intent) even though the direction to the State to pay its own counsel
was not, strictly speaking, a counsel fee allowance within the ordinary
meaning of the term; and the direction to pay Otis was based on considerations set forth in the statute and unrecognized in other proceedings. Finally, there is the naked decision to assess costs against an
escheator for defending in bad faith.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-21 (1952).
12 N.J. at 21, 95 A.2d at 725.
125 Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 219 (1950), discussed at
length beginning at note 41 supra and accompanying text.
126 Cf. Bracton's famous line, "rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub deo et sub lege
quia lex facit regem." H. DE BRACroN, DE LEGIBUs Er CONSUETUDINiBUS ANGLIAE, bk. I, ch. 8,
§ 5 (1640). The Chief Justice quoted this line in Otis, 12 N.J. at 13, 95 A.2d at 721, and
translated as follows: "The king should not be under any man but under God and under
the law, because the law makes the king."
123
124
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But in all of the cases just considered involving the construction
of the phrase "fund in court" there are grounds for dissatisfaction. In
every case the court has shown a basic disinterest either in explaining
its decision or in reconciling or relating the grounds of the instant
decision with those in the cases preceding. Milberg purported to follow Cintas but in fact went beyond it, granting an allowance to class
representatives not out of the fund they created-since Milberg et al.
were unsuccessful, they did not create such a fund-but out of a fund
already in existence and not the subject of litigation. Milberg could
have been justified, but it was not. In Koretzky, the court's explanation
was limited to a single sentence, even though the trial court had considered it lacked power. Ferguson found a "fund in court" in an action
for will construction, not only for the fiduciary seeking instruction, but
for all worthy participants. It might have justified its holding on the
grounds that the moneys were brought under the control of the court,
were the subject of litigation and relied on the precedents of Caltagirone and Farber,and even upon dictum to that effect in Cintas, but
it did not. In Driscoll and Haines the court seemed bent in not finding
a fund where the elements of a fund stared it in the face. And in Otis
it seemed bent, in suspicious generosity, in finding a fund in circumstances which, in the case of Otis, were not so special, and in the case
of the State, did not require the intervention of a court in its behalf
at all.
Due to this lack of explanation and guidance we have no clue as
to the scope of the interests to be protected and advanced by the provision for "fund in court." It seemed to have no steady meaning.
Ultimately, it would seem that the court did not have a steady vision as
to what it meant when first employed in the Rule or what it meant
after a decade of construction. And the impression of unsteadiness is
strengthened when we recall the dictum in Otis and the provision in
paragraph (e) of the Rule for the assessment in these certain cases of
counsel fees against parties defending or proffering in bad faith. This
impression will be further confirmed by a study of the next line of
cases.
The subject-of-litigation cases. Farber, following Caltagirone, will
be recalled, had declared that there could be a "fund in court" where
there was a money deposit actually in court, the subject of litigation.
In the cases arising out of this statement, the court under Vanderbilt
tended to be consistent: always to deny a fee when sought on this basis
and never to explain under what circumstances a case for such an al-
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lowance would arise. Something was always lacking. The moneys were
not actually paid into court or were not the subject of litigation or the
appellant was unsuccessful, or a combination of these three.
The first of these disappointed suitors was Janovsky of Janovsky
v. American Motorists Insurance Co. 127 Pending a hearing of his claim
before workmen's compensation based on a heart attack suffered at
work, Janovsky filed another claim under the Temporary Disability
Benefits Law against American, his employer's carrier under its private
plan, and received from it, in payment of that claim, the sum of $780.
Thereafter in workmen's compensation, he received an award of
$328.14 for temporary disability, and of $3,437.50 for permanent disability.
Under the workmen's compensation statute, Janovsky was required
to pay back to American, out of his compensation award, such sum as
he should receive in that award for temporary benefits. Janovsky
claimed that American thereby was entitled only to the return of
$328.14 and that if by law he had to repay the entire $780, he was at
least entitled to an allowance of a fee for services rendered by his
attorney in workmen's compensation. American rejected this claim.
Janovsky thereupon sued in the chancery division of the superior court
to have the court adjudge that he pay the sum of $780 into court, determine the amount due him, and determine as well whether he was
entitled to any counsel fee therefrom. The trial court held that American was entitled to the full $780 and denied any counsel fee. The supreme court on review agreed.
There are really two interrelated questions here: one, whether
under the statutes affecting compensation recovery, the employee is
entitled to set off the amounts he had to pay his attorney for his services
rendered in workmen's compensation; and two, whether under the
Rule, he is entitled to an allowance for counsel fees for the work done
by his attorney in the resolution of the first question. The supreme
court held, first, that the statutory scheme evidently required the repayment to American of the full $780; and second, that Janovsky's
claim for an allowance of counsel fees for the resolution of the first
question was without merit.
The court presumed that the judgment in his favor in workmen's
compensation embodied a proper allowance of counsel fee; if not, the
defect was a matter of an appeal, not one for a later proceeding in the
chancery division. (This, of course, would apply to the attorney's services expended in getting the awards for temporary and permanent
127

11 N.J. 1, 93 A.2d 1 (1952).
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disability and not in resolving the first question involved in this case.)
Furthermore, the court said, no allowance could be had in the chanceiy
division except in accordance with the Rule. It rejected the argument
that there was present a "fund in court." The facts were that the sum
of $780 had not actually been paid into court prior to final judgment
and that Janovsky was neither a class suitor nor a successful nonclass
suitor.
It would have helped had the court been more complete in its
explanation. Of course, Janovsky was not a class suitor; he sued for
himself. But apparently he was claiming that the sum in issue, though
not actually paid in court, was "the subject of litigation." Thus he
hoped for inclusion within the formula announced in Caltagirone.
The court met that indirectly. It noted his lack of success and relied
on a 1914 case in the old court of errors and appeals, West v. St. James'
Episcopal Church,a28 wherein it was
indicated that even where there is a fund in court allowance of
counsel fee is ordinarily denied to an unsuccessful claimant, suggesting that a contrary view "would be to encourage unnecessary
and frivolous litigation."'1 29
The court then went on to state that Janovsky should have made
reimbursement of the $780 in compliance with the statutory scheme
and with his agreement to do this with American. Failing this, the
court considered there was ample statutory authority for the entry of
an order in workmen's compensation, upon application by American
directing Janovsky to make such reimbursement, but that American
was not barred from litigating the claim in the chancery division for
failing to press it in workmen's compensation.
But this analysis overlooks the fact that Janovsky did have a
meritorious argument: whether under the various statutes and under
the agreement he had to pay the full $780 which he received from
American for temporary disability when in workmen's compensation
he was awarded less than that sum for such disability but was also
awarded greater than that sum for permanent disability. And such an
argument involves a matter of statutory construction, one properly
decided not in an administrative agency, but in a court. In addition,
the difference between the lesser sum awarded in compensation, that
of $328.14, and that of $780 was really the subject of litigation. True,
it would have been at issue in workmen's compensation if American
had filed an application in that tribunal for an order of payment for
128 83 N.J. Eq. 324, 91 A. 101 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914).
129 11 N.J. at 8, 93 A.2d at 4. As for West, see note 111 supra.
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the full $780. Since it did not, it was at issue before the chancery division. It really should not have made any significant difference whether
Janovsky had in fact paid the full sum of $780 into court prior to final
judgment. If Caltagironewas to be followed, there had to be a "fund
in court." The only satisfactory reason why Janovsky could not get an
allowance was that, as in the cases of Farber and Caltagirone,he had
litigated fruitlessly. And whereas in Milberg, the fee was awarded out
of a sum owned by parties whose class representative was Milberg, the
fund in Janovsky was owned by Janovsky's adversary. In the latter case,
it is not the quality of argument which is decisive-whether or not
meritorious-but the outcome of the suit: who by winning owns the
fund and must thereby bear the expense of paying an award, if made.
Obviously, the court should not have the winner pay the loser.
If the unsuccessful, nonclass suitor seeks in vain an allowance from
a "fund in court," would a successful nonclass suitor do better?
The answer is: no. Consider the next case, that of American Salvage Co.
v. Housing Authority," 0 which involved a condemnation proceeding
brought by the Authority against land owned by Salvage and used by
it for a junk business. Following the failure of Salvage to comply with
an order to surrender possession by the date fixed in a court order, the
Authority obtained a second order authorizing the sheriff to employ a
contractor to remove the junk. This was done at a cost of about $30,000.
The Authority paid the bill and asserted a lien for this amount against
a deposit of $100,000 it had paid into court following a condemnation
award in favor of Salvage in that amount. The lien was allowed in full
together with a further allowance of $1,000 to the Authority for counsel fees, both to be paid out of the deposit. On appeal, however, the
judgment was modified with respect to the lien and the provision for
the counsel fee was reversed and set aside. As to the latter, the supreme
court merely said:
[I]n the circumstances of the case, even if the deposit of the award
created a fund in court assessable for counsel fees under Rule
3:54-7, now R.R. 4:55-7, we discover no basis whatever to justify
in any amount to the attorney for the Housing Auan allowance
31
thority. 1

This, of course, shed no light on the problem. Unlike Janovsky, the
Authority was the successful party. Also unlike Janovsky, in this case
the money had actually been paid into court.
130 14 N.J. 271, 102 A.2d 465 (1954).
131 Id. at 281, 102 A.2d at 470. The original rules were the subject of a complete

revision, known as THE REVIsION OF THE RuLEs GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF
NEw JEPsEY (1953), to be cited as [N.J.]R.R. effective Sept. 9, 1953. N.J.R.R. 1:1-10. In that
revision, the rule regarding counsel fee allowances became [N.J.]R.R. 4:55-7.
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Was the deposit of $100,000 out of which the allowance was made
a "fund in court" within the Rule? According to Farber, following
Caltagirone, it might be if it was "the subject of litigation." Well, it
might have been said that the parties here were not disputing over the
ownership of or title to the sum which was actually in court, namely,
the $100,000 deposit, but over a different matter for a different sum,
which, if resolved against the owner of the deposit, could for convenience be taken out of the deposit. Thus, as in Caltagirone, the sum
in court was not itself the subject of litigation, but merely a security
for another claim. The court showed no inclination to make such nice
distinctions and dismissed the award without reason.
Surprisingly enough, this decision then became a precedent for a
disallowance in New Jersey Highway Authority v. J. & F. Holding
Co., 3 2 another condemnation case. There, following an award, that
Authority paid into court a sum comprised of the award with interest.
The former owners filed a petition asking that the entire sum be paid to
them. The former tenants opposed. The court favored the owners and
denied the tenants a counsel fee on the ground that there was no fund in
court. On appeal, the denial was affirmed. The language from Salvage
quoted above was seen as authority for the statement that: "we are not
persuaded in the present case that the discretionary action of the trial
judge aside from his announced reason was arbitrary or capricious.' ' 8a
This hardly seems a better reason than that given in Salvage itself.
There were better reasons which the court did not mention. Unlike
Salvage, the parties that sought the award had been unsuccessful. Thus
the denial could be affirmed on this factor, as in Farber itself and in
Janovsky. But unlike Salvage and Caltagirone, the parties in J.& F.
really disputed ownership of or title to the very sum deposited in court,
not some other claim for which the sum in court was a security. Thus
if Farbermeans anything, there was in J. & F. a "fund in court."
If then the Authority in Salvage was properly denied a fee out of
deposit since it was not the subject of litigation, and if Mrs. Farber,
Janovsky, and the tenants in J.& F. were also properly denied a fee for
being the unsuccessful nonclass parties in a dispute over a deposit,
which is the subject of litigation, what of the successful party in a dispute over a deposit, the subject of litigation? Can he shift the burden of
counsel fees to his adversary?
The successful litigant: no "fund" cases. The widow and heir of a
deceased partner, being unable to get a satisfactory accounting from the
survivors of the partnership continuing the business, sues in court for
132 40 N.J. Super. 309, 123 A.2d 25 (App. Div. 1956).
133 Id. at 318, 123 A.2d at 30.
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an accounting, obtains her relief, a share of the assets of the business,
and then seeks the further relief of an allowance of counsel fees. This
is the typical, recurring example of the successful litigant who bases
her claim for an allowance on the "fund in court" provision of the Rule.
She always loses.
In Long v. Mertz, 8 4* the case had terminated in a consent judgment
which had made no provision for a counsel fee. The widow's later application for it was refused. The appellate court ruled first, she was
barred by her consent, second, that she was barred on the questionable
authority of Driscoll and Haines that there was no fund in court, and
finally, on the sounder basis of an analysis of the problem at hand:
But the appellant goes on to say that she created a fund or that
she preserved a fund. The only fund that she created or preserved
was the fund of $38,750 that the defendants are ordered to pay her.
But she does not want to be paid a counsel fee or expenses out of

that fund; she wants to be paid counsel fees and expenses in addition to the fund. She wants a personal judgment against the defendants. 185
Of course, this is the rub. In the ordinary case, the winning party establishes full rights to the sum in court. But if the sum thus won is the
"fund in court," what good does it do for the winner to be paid out of
what is now her own fund? This is what the supreme court so questionably did for the State in Otis. To help the winner, it is necessary to go
beyond the fund. But this goes beyond Farberand enters the ordinarily
forbidden land of Liberty Title v. Plews.
The same partnership situation was involved in Blut v. Katz.1a6
It was decided the same way. The court there conceded
that in the case of a partnership the surviving partners or partner
is in some measure a fiduciary for the estate of the deceased partner and accountable as such to his estate with respect to all assets
of the partnership....
But plaintiff seeks a fee, not out of moneys recovered (nor out of
moneys which were deposited by defendants with the court to avoid
a receivership and which have now been paid over to her on account of her judgment), but out of the defendants' shares in the

partnership. She has rendered no benefit to the entire partnership
estate. She has not attempted to preserve or perform any service for
defendants' shares; nor has she in any way, directly or indirectly,

acted for defendants' benefit. Indeed, the issue is directly controlled
by what we had to say in Long v. Mertz ....
134 21 N.J. Super. 401, 91 A.2d 341 (App. Div. 1952).
138 Id. at 404, 91 A.2d at 342.
138 36 N.J. Super. 185, 115 A.2d 119 (App. Div. 1955).

137 Id. at 190-91, 115 A.2d at 122.
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Mrs. Blut lost because, like Mrs. Long, the funds in court were
her own. She cannot recover out of the entire partnership estate because, again as in the case of Mrs. Long, she had not worked for the
benefit of a class and, perhaps, because none of the assets of the partnership were actually in the custody of the court other than those deposited with the court to avoid receivership, which she had already
won. The court did not advert to the prior statement of the supreme
court in Otis where it stated that it is "well recognized" that an action
of this type "in the nature of an accounting" the property is in the
control of the court,8 8 creating a "fund in court" within the meaning
of the Rule. Blut seemed to regard it necessary that the funds constituting the "fund" be actually in the custody of the court, where the
plaintiff was not suing, at least in part, on behalf of someone other
than herself.
For the case before it, Blut was a serviceable enough opinion. It
had the added merit that, almost uniquely in the days of the Vanderbilt court, it offered an analysis and systemization of all the cases bearing on "fund in court." But it gave undue weight to the preservationof-a-trust fund case (Cintas-Koretzsky) to the almost total neglect of
the subject-of-litigation cases (Caltagirone-Farber),analyzing Ferguson
solely in terms of the former and omitting from its consideration the
dictum in Cintas regarding the construction of a will or trust agreement. As we shall see, this analysis proved highly influential with the
supreme court when in later years, under Chief Justice Weintraub, it
undertook its own systematic re-examination of the "fund in court"
provision, with results ultimately divisive.
In the following year a similar situation was involved in Schmerer
v. Estate of Marcus Kirschenbaum.139 In that case, however, plaintiff
was the surviving partner suing for an accounting of the estate of a
decedent former partner. In an interim order, the court restrained the
executrix from distributing a part of the estate. Defendant denied
the existence of a partnership and prevailed at the trial. Nevertheless
the trial court regarded the plaintiff's case as meritorious, considered the
decedent's estate as constituting a "fund" and awarded plaintiff a
counsel fee. The appellate division reversed on the authority of Long
v. Mertz and Blut v. Katz, that a partnership estate does not constitute
a "fund in court," and of Janovsky, that one suing unsuccessfully in
one's own interest is not entitled to a fee.
Finally, there is Mrs. Lambert of In re Lambert,140 another ex138
139
140

See note 119 supra,
39 N.J. Super. 475, 121 A.2d 414 (App. Div. 1956).
33 N.J. Super. 90, 109 A.2d 423 (Ch. 1954).
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ample of an unsuccessful successful litigant. She, having been adjudicated of unsound mind in the county court and committed, contested
through retained counsel her husband's suit in the chancery division to
have her declared incompetent and himself appointed her guardian.
After a jury found her competent, she applied for an award of counsel
fees. The court had to deny her application. Since she had been found
competent, there was no "fund in court" (albeit had she been found
incompetent her estate would have constituted such a "fund"), and
therefore no basis for an award. Mrs. Lambert was somewhat in the
position of caveator in a will contest; but unfortunately for her neither
the terms of paragraph (b) nor of paragraph (e) of the Rule were broad
enough to cover the merits of her case, and for want of this forethought
the equities in her favor were unavailing.
But if the successful party in a simple suit on behalf of her own
interests must fail in the matter of an allowance for counsel fees because ordinarily the fee she seeks must come not out of the "fund" but
out of the pockets of her adversary; and if, as we have previously seen,
an unsuccessful party must also fail because unsuccessful, what meaning
does "the subject of litigation" formula have? When will it be used?
Why would not the court either give an adequate explanation or simply
rewrite the Rule?
The cases of the successful Mrs. Long, Blut, and Lambert were
apparently so many cases of statutory-like construction wherein the
judges sought justice only within the intent of the legislator. Such a
task proves difficult when the legislator obscures his intent and won't,
even in the face of patent obscurity, amend the enactment.
A summary. Two questions come to mind in reviewing these cases.
The first: What was the court's legislative intent in providing for an
allowance out of a "fund in court"? What was the matter of procedure
regulated? The second: How did the court explain the contents of this
provision? What was the process whereby it ruled in this matter of
supposed procedure?
First, the contents. What did the phrase, "fund in court," include?
It would seem from a rather lengthy and laborious reading of the cases
that first of all, it included the case of the class representative who, for
the benefit of his class, either successfully preserves (Koretzky) or creates
a fund (Cintas) or, though failing, advances meritorious arguments in
the cause (Milberg). In the first instance he is granted an allowance out
of the fund preserved or created to prevent an unjust enrichment. In
the second instance, he receives reimbursement from other assets of
the class in order to insure for the class representation in its need, at
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least where these other assets happen to be in court. On similar grounds
was the allowance for the administrator or trustee in an action for construction of a will or trust (Ferguson) or for the next friend to an incompetent (Equitable Trust). In any event, in the case of the class
representative, there is this conceptual difficulty: that the award purportedly coming out of the "fund in court" may come not at all out of
any funds actually in court, but out of the pockets of the group he
represents. And whether successful or not, the fee, when allowed, is
forthcoming not from an adversary, but from the litigant's own side.
This remark leads us to the second large group of cases, those
wherein the party seeking the allowance does not represent a group or
person in need. Such a litigant, it had been stated in Farber following
Caltagirone,could get an allowance as out of a "fund in court" where
moneys actually in the custody of the court were the subject of litigation. This would appear to apply to the case of an allowance for worthy
participants in a suit to construe a will or trust, at least insofar as nonfiduciaries are concerned. Cintas was authority for this. But in Ferguson
this basis was ignored. And when the court decided upon an allowance
out of the estate involved for both proponent and contestant in a will
contest, it had recourse to a separate amendment of the Rule in paragraph (e), rather than to the "fund in court" provision of paragraph (b).
And in cases not involving estates, all litigants in search of an
allowance in reliance on the formula of "the subject of litigation" were
systematically frustrated. He might be unsuccessful, as in Caltagirone
and Farber, or as in Janovsky, J. & F., and Schmerer. Unlike the case
of a class suitor or one who sues for an incompetent, he needs no encouragement; he sues only for himself. Besides, the moneys constituting
the "fund" belong not to the class or person he serves, but to his adversary. He might be successful in the suit only to be denied an allowance, as in Long, Blut, and Lambert, on the ground that the only
moneys actually in the custody of the court and which were the subject
of litigation he has already won or owns; or, as in Salvage, on no
grounds at all (but perhaps for the reason that the moneys in that case
while actually in court were not the subject of litigation, but merely
security for another claim which was the subject of litigation).
The legislative intent then was not very clear. Insofar as entitlement was concerned, the term "fund in court" cut one way for a litigant
involved in the usual adversary situation, another for one involved in
an action for will or trust construction, and a third for the litigant suing
on behalf of a class or a person in need. Insofar as the requirements of
a "fund" are concerned, there seemed no telling: sometimes the moneys
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had to be actually in the custody of the court, sometimes not. We
certainly cannot say what, even after Farber, was the court's original
intent in writing the provision; and after many case decisions, despite
much analysis and careful refinement, we are still in the dark.
This leads us to the second question posed at the beginning of
this section: How did the court explain the contents of its provision?
Poorly, if at all, we must conclude. Milberg was misleading, Koretzky
barely adequate and Ferguson confused. The cases following "the subject of litigation" formula seemed enigmatic; Driscoll and Haines inexplicable; Otis shifting. The partnership cases and Lambert, if correct,
were unsatisfying: Why should these ladies-in-need be denied their
allowance? Because the ordinary rule is that all suitors must bear the
burden of their own litigation? But, why? If the trial judges can be
trusted to do equity for the class suitors, why not for the ladies-in-need?
What is most noteworthy about the court's performances throughout these various decisions is the lack of explanation. In all of these
cases, the court seemed loath to state the policies served by the Rule,
to identify the interests it deemed worthy of protection and to discuss
the reasons for this protection. Then, there is the lack of consistency.
Inclined to abrupt statement, the court seemed uninterested in precedent or in examining its decisions and establishing the law in logical
patterns.
The Rule accordingly took on a quality of the absolute, of imperviability to reason. It was as though it had a separate existence in and
of itself, its mere existence being meaning enough. Thus ordinarily
there was no need to appeal to reason, to a system of underlying relationships. In this process, the Rule, having been made, was administered and the cases disposed of as so many unconnected units of
business. For want of the usual judicial process, there came to be no
genuine law of counsel fees; no sense of meaning, of depth; but instead
a routine succession of decisions. It is difficult to escape the conclusion
that the constitutional power of the justices to legislate, to make rules
governing practice and procedure, had been exercised at the expense
of their psychological power to act judicially in their regard.
But if the court's performance with the "fund" in paragraph (b)
of the rule has borne the mark of a certain loss in judicial power, its
performance regarding the following paragraph suggests a more serious
defect.
Paragraph(c)-"In an action for the foreclosure of mortgage"
Could a bank, having obtained a judgment "in an action for the

1972]

COUNSEL FEES

foreclosure of a mortgage," have included in such judgment an award
for counsel fees calculated at a rate set forth in the bond accompanying
the mortgage (3 percent of the principal sum but in no event less than
$75)? In other words, where the parties have, before the action, contracted for the allowable compensation for attorney's fees in the event
of a foreclosure action, will the court honor the contract or will it set
it aside as in conflict with the provisions of paragraph (c) of the Rule
regarding counsel fees, which limited the allowance to 2 percent of the
first $5,000 of the principal sum of the mortgage, 1 percent of the next
$5,000 and 0.5 percent on the sum in excess of $10,000?
This was the issue in Bank of Commerce v. Markakos.141 The trial
court discreetly followed the Rule. The bank appealed to the appellate
division from the denial of an allowance in excess of the rule schedule,
arguing that it was entitled to the fee stipulated in the bond as a matter
of contract regardless of the Rule, that the Rule did not supersede or
invalidate the covenant, and that if it did, 142 thereby precluding enforcement of the contractual provision, the Rule was beyond the constitutional power of the supreme court. This was a frontal attack.
Naturally, it did not succeed; the appellate division affirmed. 143 The
Bank then appealed to the supreme court, asserting that its right to an
allowance pursuant to the covenant in the bond was a substantive right
and the mortgagee's duty to pay the fee was a substantive duty. Therefore the allowance was not a matter of practice and procedure, hence
not controllable by rule, but only by the legislature through appropriate statutory provision. It argued further that the legislature had repealed such legislation as there had been regarding provision for such
allowances in mortgage foreclosure actions, leaving the field free of
statutory regulations.
Thus we have here, and not in Otis, the first case in which a party
had contended that the matter of counsel fees was one of substantive
law and not procedure and therefore beyond the competence of the
supreme court. The opinion for the court was written by Chief Justice
Vanderbilt; the argument was rejected. Remarkably, there were no
dissents.
The court held that there never existed in the State of New Jersey
the purported right to contract as to counsel fees; that any attempt by
141 22 N.J. 428, 126 A.2d 346 (1956).
142 In Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., the court had already held that

parties cannot by consent grant the trial court power to grant an allowance in a case
forbidden by the rules. 8 N.J. at 496, 86 A.2d at 232. See notes 113 et seq. supra with accompanying text.
143 41 N.J. Super. 246, 124 A.2d 605 (App. Div. 1956).
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private parties "would have been struck down as against public policy
' 1 44
quite as much as it would if the Legislature had attempted to do so."

The legislature had attempted to do so, but as noted by a court reporter
in an appendage to an old equity case, the public policy of this state was
to leave the allowance of counsel fees to the discretion of the chancellor, to be exercised in each particular case in accordance with
which in their nature forbid an arbitrary rule
equitable principles,
by percentage. 145
The statute had then been ignored. Accordingly, reasoned the court,
the public policy of the state would have been equally against a blind
allowance based upon a contractual provision or a blind allowance
based upon "an arbitrary rule by percentage."
It is strange that the court should invoke the aid of this old policy
in chancery, a policy which would have ignored the set limits of the
court's own rule along with the set limits of the parties in favor of a
policy of discretion which it, the supreme court, had already repudiated in its former decisions. The court's line of reasoning, in reality, is
of questionable soundness. It goes like this: the attempt to contract for
a fixed rate of counsel fees is and has been against public policy. It
was so held where the legislature attempted to permit it. Therefore
there is not and never was any such substantive right.
However old equity ignored the statute not because of any substantive impropriety in contracting regarding counsel fees, but because
the provision for a fixed rate interfered with its power to fashion a
remedy along equitable lines to fit the demands of justice; or in other
words, with its power to redress the damages to a plaintiff in foreclosure as the trial court deemed fit. But this power to fashion remedies
in the matter of counsel fees was denied the trial court in Liberty Title
because abrogated by rule. Since this is so, the old objection to the
legislative enactment with regard to the matter being thereby removed,
there is no long-standing policy in existence against it. Therefore such
a statute, or agreement in the absence of statute, should be enforced as
a matter of substantive law.
The issue therefore remains whether such a contractual provision
is entitled to enforcement as a matter of substantive law, or whether it
is procedural and therefore subject to the rule. The court never really
faced the issue. It drew comfort from the fact that the former statutory
provisions on this subject in old Title 2 had been deleted in the re144
145

1893).

22 N.J. at 432, 126 A.2d at 348.
United Security Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Smith, 51 N.J. Eq. 635 (Ct. Err. & App.
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vision and did not appear in the new Title 2A. Since one of the purposes of the revision was to strip the statute books of all its procedural
enactments inconsistent with the rules of procedure, the disappearance
of the pertinent counsel fee provisions should be, the court argued,
regarded as legislative acquiescence that the matter of a counsel fee
award was a matter of procedure. Counsel's position was simply that
if the legislature repealed or deleted these provisions, considering them
procedural, it was mistaken. The court never really considered it. It
regarded the legislative position as decisive, relied on the old policy in
chancery and dismissed the appeal because it "manifestly presents no
substantial constitutional issue.' 1 46 No opinion of the court has had
less influence. It is an unhappy non-precedent.
Paragraph(d)-"asprovided by these rules": Local 449, An Exceptional
Case
The week after the decision in Bank of Commerce, oral argument
began in the case of Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Local 449, Electrical Workers.147 Westinghouse had obtained ex parte injunctions on
three different occasions against the union, but after a hearing involving oral examination and cross-examination of witnesses and full
argument, the chancery division vacated the injunctions. Then Westinghouse filed a supplemental complaint seeking an injunction against
picketing and obtained a new order to show cause, but this time without the ex parte restraint. In the face of a union demand for discovery,
Westinghouse moved for dismissal of the proceedings. The union did
not oppose this, rather it applied for an award of counsel fees. The trial
court awarded the union an allowance of $5,250 and an appeal was
taken solely on the issue of the trial court's power to make such an
award. The supreme court decided there was such power.
In this case, counsel were diplomatic. All agreed that the allowance
of counsel fees is essentially a matter of procedure. The supreme court
14
agreed, citing Bank of Commerce, Otis, and Westervelt's. 8
Westinghouse argued that the grant below had no specific authorization under the rules. The union's argument was of necessity
more complicated. First, it looked to the rule on counsel fees, which
read: "No fee for legal services shall be allowed ... except: .. .(d) As
provided by these rules with respect to any action . . . ." Next, it

turned to the rule governing "Labor disputes," R.R. 4:67-9, which pro146

22 N.J. at 432, 126 A.2d at 348.

147 23 N.J. 170, 128 A.2d 457 (1957).
148 John S. Westervelt's Sons v. Regency, Inc., 3 N.J. 472, 70 A.2d 767 (1950), discussed
at length beginning at note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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vided "The rules of court do not supersede [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-51
to 58], inclusive, relating to labor disputes." It then referred to the
statute, where in § 2A: 15-53, it was provided that no interlocutory
injunction shall be allowed until the plaintiff shall first file with the
court a bond in favor of the persons enjoined sufficient to secure to
them "their court costs, attorney and counsel fees taxed against the
plaintiff, in the event that the injunctive relief sought is subsequently
denied by the court .

. . ."

This, the union argued, constituted an

implied statutory authority for an allowance, not superseded by rule. 149
Westinghouse, of course, argued that the supreme court did not
thereby intend to establish an authority in the trial court to grant
counsel fees. The supreme court itself, remarkably, thought otherwise.
The legislature had intended, it concluded, to render "the employer...
subject to such liability for wrongful or unsuccessful attempts at restraint" and thus to equalize his superior capital position in "suits
which might be designed to harass and embarrass" '15 0 labor unions by
providing for the allowance of counsel fees and costs in unsuccessful
suits. R.R. 4:67-9 was intended to preserve intact all the provisions
of the statute. Thus the statute working through the rules gave authority to the trial court to award counsel fees. "The dominant control
of the court in matters of procedure necessitated such an approach,"' 5'
it said.
There is, of course, nothing improper in the court adopting suggestions made by some other authority in matters of procedure by
incorporation in the rules. But the court had rejected this approach in
Otis, striking down the statutory scheme for awards in proceedings for
escheat. And in Bank of Commerce, the court had recently remarked
that an attempt by the legislature to fix a fee in an action to foreclose
a mortgage would be, and had been, contrary to public policy. But in
the case of a labor dispute, the legislative enactments are not stricken
or ignored. It is true the formalities are observed. It is still the supreme
court which has ultimately authorized the award through its rules. But
in reality the court has deferred to the legislature.
Moreover, in its analysis of the policy underlying the statute, the
court adverted to considerations which are usually regarded as matters
of substance and remedy in such phrases as "suits which might be designed to harass and embarrass" and "if the employer were not subject
to such liability" and "labor would be protected through compensa149 See briefs of parties, 447 BRiEFs OF NEw JERSEY SUPREME COURT.

150 23 N.J. at 176, 128 A.2d at 460.
151 Id. at 177, 128 A.2d at 461.
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tion." This is the language of substantive law and the law of damages,
of Harper and James and Prosser, of Sedgwick and McCormick.
Exceptions to the Rule-the moneylender cases
It was possible to have limited the effect of Local 449. A statute
had been accommodated, it could have been argued, but it was the
exceptional case wherein another rule had been found to have authorized the accommodation, that concerning "labor disputes." Thus
unless in another case you can point to another such special rule of
authorization, another such statute will not be accommodated. Quickly
this was held not to be so. A new precedent was soon established whereunder one could get an allowance if one had, pursuant to a statute,
contracted for an allowance.
In Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Reeves,152 decided five
months after Local 449, it was held that a finance company (0, worthy
litigantl) which had repossessed an auto and sold it subject to a conditional sales contract, was, in an action for a deficiency judgment
against the original purchasers and guarantors, entitled to deduct from
the proceeds of the resale all expenses for the retaking including a
reasonable attorney's fee because the conditional sales contract had so
provided. Accordingly, the appellate division affirmed such part of the
default judgment as included an attorney's fee representing 15 percent
of the deficiency, and noted without comment that plaintiff relied on
the provisions of the then N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 17:16B-6 "which sanc-

tions a counsel fee not exceeding 15% in retail installment contracts.' u5 3 It distinguished Bank of Commerce: the stipulation for coun-

sel fees there was in direct violation of a specific rule on the subject,
R.R. 4:55-7(c). Not so here, and "we do not believe the ruling should
54
be extended by this Division beyond the boundaries of that case.'1
It was possible to distinguish further between the cases. In Commerce, the bank sought an allowance in the foreclosure proceedings for
services rendered in those very proceedings, whereas in Maryland, the
finance company sought in the deficiency judgment proceedings an
allowance or credit really for the work done in repossessing, work done
before the commencement of the deficiency proceedings started. This
was a difference, but the court did not appear interested in differenti152 45 N.J. Super. 205, 132 A.2d 36 (App. Div. 1957).
153 The statute was repealed in 1960 and replaced by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-42(b)
(1970) which provides in part:
the retail installment contract may also provide for the payment of attorney's
fees not exceeding 20% on the first $500.00 and 10% on any excess of the amount
due and payable under such contract when referred to an attorney . ...
154 45 N.J. Super. at 208, 132 A.2d at 38.
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ating. It was as though the judges were interested only in curtailing
the influence of the Rule without involving themselves in a discussion
of its reasonableness.
The effect of Maryland was to limit Bank of Commerce and the
rules drastically. A statute had sanctioned a counsel fee up to 15 percent in a retail installment contract. The parties had contracted; therefore a judgment authorizing a 15 percent counsel fee was affirmed.
Before Maryland, R.R. 4:55-7 had to specifically authorize such an
allowance either by its own terms or by virtue of its incorporation of
the terms of another rule, such as the one on labor disputes. Without
such authorization, to quote the language of the rule: "No fee for
legal services shall be allowed." By virtue of Maryland, the subject
becomes reversed; there it is said, in effect, that unless R.R. 4:55-7
specifically forbids it, as in Commerce, the allowance is proper, where
agreed to pursuant to statute.
Another twist in the judicial road. But this twist has proved to
be a lasting one. Thereafter the appellate courts have consistently followed the course of upholding contractual provisions for counsel fees
except where, following Commerce, the case is covered by specific rule
of court. Maryland has had more life than Commerce.
In Bancredit, Inc. v. Bethea, 55 the appellate division went further.
Defendants had bought a used car from a dealer, signing a conditional
sales contract and giving as part of their purchase price a note payable
over two years. The note, pursuant to the statute cited in Maryland,
contained a provision for an additional 15 percent as attorney's
fees if placed in his hands for collection. The dealer sold the note and
the contract to Bancredit for $650. Defendants made payments totaling
about $139 and defaulted. The car was repossessed and sold at public
sale for $350. The appellate division in its opinion, without further
explanation, noted that, nonetheless, the sum of $448.99 was still due
and owing on the note, such sum including attorney's fees as authorized
in the note. Judgment was subsequently entered for that amount, plus
costs.
In assessing costs, the trial judge approved another allowance for
attorney's fees in an amount equal to 5 percent of the total judgment,
pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 22A:2-42, which provides that the district court shall include in the taxed costs against the judgment debtor
"a fee to the attorney of the prevailing party, of five per centum (5%)
of the first five hundred dollars ($500.00) of the judgment. .. ."
The appellate division found "neither inconsistency nor repeti155 65 N.J. Super. 538, 168 A.2d 250 (App. Div. 1961).

1972]

COUNSEL FEES

tion in the court's allowance of both of these amounts."'u 1 The 15 percent award was a recognition of the parties' contractual arrangement,
its reasonableness sanctioned by statute. (But in Commerce, the supreme court had recalled that the old chancery court had always regarded an allowance by "an arbitrary rule of percentage" as against
public policy.) Moreover, it was not conditioned upon the institution
of a suit. (No, but it could be collected against the will of the promissor only through a suit.) Again, the 15 percent accrues to the noteholder and not to his attorney. The 5 percent allowance, on the other
hand, accrues for, and is directly payable to, his attorney. And as a
taxed cost, it is in the nature of a statutory penalty against the judgment debtor. Nor would the court even confine the plaintiff to a choice
between the allowances. It was entitled to them both. Credit and finance companies are surely the most favored of all litigants.
Maryland Credit and Bancredit had the benefit of protective statutes. What about a moneylender who, though not thus protected, has
inserted in the note upon which he lends money a provision for the
collection of attorney's fees in the amount of a specified percentage of
the unpaid balance? Is he entitled to an allowance in the judgment for
the attorney's fees? Gramatan National Bank & Trust Co. v. Backman,157 decided before Commerce, had said yes. There the note had
provided for 18 percent of the unpaid balance for the expense of collection and attorney's fees; and the judgment awarding 5 percent of
the unpaid balance for attorney's fees was affirmed. The propriety of
the allowance was not challenged.
In First Savings & Loan Association v. Heldman,158 decided after
Commerce, the court had before it an attachment suit to collect the
balance due on a note. The note contained a provision for "reasonable
attorney's fees if collected by law or through an attorney at law." There
was no statutory sanction for such a proviso, since the underlying transaction was not a retail sale and was not otherwise covered by statute.
Nevertheless, the court allowed a fee of 15 percent for the attorney, inclusive of disbursements. Influenced by Maryland and Bancredit, it regarded Gramatanas the controlling precedent. Once again Commerce
was limited.
If First Savings is correct-and really on what grounds can it be
faulted-then what about the case of the prudent businessman, who
entering upon an ordinary agreement with another, contracts that in
Id. at 552, 168 A.2d at 258.
30 N.J. Super. 349, 104 A.2d 729 (App. Div. 1954).
158 79 N.J. Super. 65, 190 A.2d 400 (Bergen County Ct. 1963).

156

157
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the event of a law suit for breach of the agreement he will be entitled
to the reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the suit on the breach? Is
he entitled to an allowance in his judgment for attorney's fees? If so,
has not the policy of the Rule been stretched to the breaking point, and
with it the accompanying thesis, that allowances for counsel fees are
merely matters of procedure? But this challenge came later, after the
days of the Vanderbilt court. And since in this section we will confine
ourselves to the Vanderbilt court's view of the over-all subject of counsel fees, we shall defer discussion of that coming challenge to a subsequent section. For now, we shall pass on to a consideration of the other
exceptions carved out of the Rule by the Vanderbilt court.
The suit for malicious prosecution. The second of these exceptions
to be discussed had actually been made quite early. It involved the
remedy for a claim for malicious prosecution set forth in Mayflower
Industries v. Thor Corp.159 Mayflower had sued to enjoin Thor from
dealing with parties other than Mayflower as distributor of its products
in certain areas and for breach of contract damages. Thor counterclaimed for malicious prosecution of the action. Mayflower dismissed
its complaint with prejudice and then moved to dismiss Thor's counterclaim, seeking in the alternative an elimination from the counterclaim
the demand for recovery of costs and counsel fees incurred in defending against the allegedly maliciously prosecuted complaint. The trial
court noted that there might have been a problem in trying the counterclaim with the original complaint of Mayflower since the law had
been that the original proceeding must have terminated before an action for malicious prosecution can be instituted. But in view of the
complaint's dismissal, that problem had been cured. As to an award
for counsel fees, there was no problem. It said:
The present case is a damage suit for malicious prosecution.
It is not an application for counsel fees in the original injunction
proceeding. If it were, in the absence of a bond, our Rule 3:54-7
would bar any such allowances....
In malicious prosecution cases the well nigh universal rule is
that reasonable costs and counsel fees incurred in defending the
action maliciously brought, are an element of damage. 160
An appeal was taken to the appellate division from the various
orders of the trial court and certified by the supreme court on its own
motion. In a brief per curiam opinion, it affirmed for the reasons expressed below.
159 15 N.J. Super. 139, 83 A.2d 246 (Ch. 1951), aff'd, 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952).
160 Id. at 175, 83 A.2d at 264.
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It is indeed unfortunate that the supreme court did not give us
the benefit of its own separate opinion on this subject. We should like
to know, for instance, why if Thor seeks costs and counsel fees against
Mayflower in the original proceeding as part of the judgment dismissing the injunction complaint such a matter is, as the trial court apparently considered, denominated a matter of procedure, to be governed
by the rules and disallowed thereunder; and why if it seeks an allowance of the same costs and counsel fees in a separate suit or in a counterclaim in the same suit, such are governed by "the well nigh universal
rule ...[and allowable as] an element of damage," and thus an inextricable part of a remedy for a substantive cause of action.
Reimbursement of expenses-unjustifiable trial tactics. A third exception to the all-exclusive reach of the Rule was made at about the
same time as that for the case of malicious prosecution. In Allegro v.
Afton Village Corp.,16x the very basic issue was raised: whether a trial
court faced with a belated application for adjournment may grant the
request conditioned on the applicant's payment of a sum calculated to
reimburse his adversary for the loss suffered by the delay. In that case
the trial judge required a tardy plaintiff to pay "costs of $200" to his
defendant as condition for his order of adjournment. The supreme
court not only approved, but reversed a later dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint for his failure to be ready on the adjourned date. It considered that plaintiff's conduct did not warrant dismissal and directed
instead that plaintiff further pay defendant the reasonable costs of its
preparation for trial on the adjourned date. Chief Justice Vanderbilt
dissented, not because he thought the remedy unauthorized, but because he judged it too mild. Characteristically, he voted for dismissal.
In New Jersey Highway Authority v. Renner,162 a similar allowance to the Authority in the sum of $150 as condition for a grant of a
belated request for adjournment was considered proper on the precedent of Allegro, "not as a counsel fee ...

nor perhaps as costs ...

but

as a reimbursement of expenses to which the Authority had been
put."1 63 Call it what you will, the reality is that a party is being compelled by order of the court, without authorization in the rules and in
direct contradiction to the prohibition expressed in RULE 3:54-7, to
pay his adversary's expenses including that of counsel fees.
161

9 N.J. 156, 87 A.2d 430 (1952).

162 32 N.J. Super. 197, 108 A.2d 107 (App. Div. 1954), afJ'd, 18 N.J. 485, 114 A.2d 555

(1955). The issue of the propriety of allowances for reimbursement of "expenses" was not
discussed in the supreme court's opinion. Included in the expenses were the cost to the
Authority of bringing into court on the trial date two of defendant's former attorneys
and two of its own employees as witnesses.
163 Id. at 202-03, 108 A.2d at 110.
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There should be no quarrel with the result. To deny a trial court
the power to make an Allegro order in the absence of rule would seriously affect the sound administration of justice. And the alternate
remedy--dismissal of a complaint or suppression of a defense-is too
harsh, one not suited to the nature of the offense: the waste of an adversary's agent's time, which means money.
Allegro was then a necessity and, as usual, necessity led to discoveries. The first, that the trial court must in certain cases be supported
in its formulation of rules regarding the orderly practice and procedure in its own court even in the absence of a rule of court; thus, it was
recognized that the power to make rules regarding practice and procedure must not always be in the supreme court. The second, that
breaches of such rules must be remedied; for otherwise the orderly administration of justice would be subverted and parties relying on such
order would suffer a loss of time and money thereby. A third, that the
remedy for such violation to be administered by the trial court must
compensate for the harm caused by the breach. Fourth, that such remedy must be sustained even if it in effect violates the provisions of RULE
3:54-7, forbidding the award of a counsel fee except as specifically provided in that or other rules of the supreme court.
The court should have concluded therefore that as a matter of
practicality it could be neither the sole author of rules of practice and
procedure as held in Winberry nor the sole determinant by rule of
court of the circumstances whereunder the remedy of counsel fees
could be awarded, as held in Liberty Title v. Plews. The court, however, did not apparently draw these conclusions. Instead, proceeding
as before, it subsequently amended the provisions of R.R. 4:41, governing the assignment of cases for trial, by adding a new section, R.R.
4:41-6, wherein it codified the result in Allegro. Thereafter, the allowance to an aggrieved party of the "reasonable expenses to which the
latter and his attorney had been put in attending the court, including
a reasonable attorney's fee for the attendance' '1 64 was provided by rule
and thus within the authority of the rule on counsel fee, by then R.R.
4:55-7(d). Thus in the court's view, it alone was the sole author of this
rule of trial practice and procedure and the sole determinant of the
164 In the 1969 revision of the rules, this provision was combined with a similar one
in N.J.R.R. 4:29-1(c), regarding the failure to attend a pretrial conference, into one rule,
the present N.J.R. 1:2-4. The new rule does not provide for the alternate penalty formerly
set forth in N.J.R.R. 4:41-6, namely the payment by the offending party of a sum not
exceeding $50.00 to the clerk of the court. Thus the old rule recognized the double offense
involved in a belated application for adjournment, one to the adversary, the other to the
public.
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circumstances whereunder the remedy for an allowance of counsel fees
could be awarded. The holdings of Winberry and Liberty Title, evaded
in Allegro, were thus followed in the later amendment. The court as
legislator could do what as court it was not able to do: give justice and
honor the holdings in Winberry and Liberty Title.
Of course implicit in this new amendment was the reaffirmation
of the premise that the remedy permitted, the allowance of counsel
fees, was a matter of practice and procedure, as was the harm for whose
remedy the allowance was authorized. But upon reflection it should
have been recognized that the remedy allowed was in protection of a
litigant's interest quite similar to the litigant's interest protected in a
suit for malicious prosecution. Just as in the latter suit counsel fees
are allowed to vindicate a person's interest in freedom from litigation
the conduct of which, considered in its entirety, is unjustifiable, so in
the case of a belated application for trial adjournment, counsel fees
are allowed to vindicate a person's interest in freedom from the unjustifiable trial tactic. In either case, infringement of the freedom results in an unwarranted expenditure of a lawyer's time and the litigant's
money. In either case the rights and duties involved are incidents of
the law of torts. The court in Allegro gave implicit recognition of the
underlying realities by setting aside for the case the prohibition of
its own rule concerning counsel fees and giving effect to the requirements of substantive law.
A summation. The swift, simple solution to the problem of counsel fees in RULE 3:54-7 (later R.R. 4:55-7) had not, after all, been
either swift or simple. Allegro, even in the court's own terms, aside
from the considerations raised in our analysis, did not suggest simplicity. Its companion cases suggested the solution had not been swift. If
in Allegro, the court gave de facto recognition to a litigant's interest
in freedom from a particular unjustifiable trial tactic, in Mayflower,
it gave de jure recognition to his interest in a general freedom from
unjustifiable litigation by reaffirming his substantive claim in the tort
of malicious prosecution (although it rather confused us by suggesting
the nonrecognition of such a claim in the very suit maliciously prosecuted). In Otis, similarly, the court suggested by dictum that it would
protect the interest of the state in its freedom against the maintenance
of an unjustificable defense through the entire course of the litigation,
without regard to the Rule. In Maryland and the other moneylender
cases, it recognized the right of a litigant-free of the rules-to protect
himself in advance by contract against the cost of the entire conduct
of litigation arising from its contractual relation with another without
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consideration of whether or not conduct of the litigation was in fact,
in whole or in part, justifiable. In Local 449 it liberally construed a
rule and an accompanying statute so as to recognize the interest of a
labor union in freedom from the entire conduct of litigation unsuccessfully, although not necessarily unjustifiably, pursued. In all of these
cases cognate interests are given protection despite the Rule or, in the
case of the labor union, an exceptional protection under the Rule.
If the problem of counsel fees has not received an adequate solution in the Rule, neither has it received a consistent solution in the
Rule's own terms. Apart from the special treatment accorded the labor
union, why should, in paragraph (c) of the Rule, the mortgage foreclosurer be accorded a partial protection? And why, further, the later
addition of paragraph (e), wherein the trial court is empowered in a
contest of will or codicil to protect the interest of the proferror or the
contestant, as the case may be, in freedom from unjustifiable litigation
through the course of the entire suit? The protection accorded by the
Rule is neither consistent nor equal.
Then, in another connection, the protection accorded by the rule
was uncertain-when it involved a "fund in court." In Caltagironeand
Farberit considered a "fund" present in a simple adversary litigation
since moneys in the actual custody of the court were the subject of the
litigation, but denied a fee to the unsuccessful party. The successful
party, however, precisely because of his success, would scarcely resort
to a "fund" he owned for protection. Yet, except for a brief suggestion
in Blut, the court did little to settle the confusion. Indeed its award to
the State in Otis served only to confuse the more. And the practice of
allowances for worthy participants in an action for will construction
seemed without basis, Ferguson.
In Cintas, Farberand Milberg it found a "fund" in a class action.
In this, we may include the case of trust or estate administration. But
it failed to clearly distinguish this type of case from that involving
simple adversaries and the different bases for award in either case. In
the class suit, it seemed to have trouble in adjudicating consistently,
as in Driscoll and Haines, and in giving the bench and bar an adequate
basis for its adjudications. The reasons for Milberg were misleading
(for if the class suitor had lost, the allowance could not come out of the
fund which he had not preserved or created, but out of the pockets of
his class members), for Koretzky too brief, for Otis pointless in part
(as concerned the State) and sufficient in part (as concerned Otis, only
when considered in isolation). For if Otis was to be awarded a fee for
the expense of proving the State's case, why not, as asked in the dis-
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sent, 16 5 a fee for the expense incurred in discovery? The court had in
the Rule determined upon, in the case of a "fund in court," an exception to the general prohibition against an allowance. It had failed to
communicate the basis in reason for the determination.
This failure is not surprising. On the same fundamental level, the
level of adequacy in basis, the entire Rule is at fault. Given the determination that the interests of certain litigants are to be protected under the Rule and the interests of others not, are the interests involved
procedural or substantive? Is the remedy afforded or denied a matter
of practice and procedure rather than one in aid of substantive rights?
The court's thesis-that both the interests and the remedy are matters
of practice and procedure-does not stand of its own force. When affronted, as in Banh of Commerce, it avoids collapse only by circumlocution. When pressed, as in Allegro, Mayflower, Maryland and Local
449, it is maintained not by the strength of its own inner energy, but
by the use of artful euphemisms and unexplained exceptions. At bottom, the thesis stands not by the force of reason, but supported from
below by the power of authority.
Epilogue: The Vanderbilt Court Departs
The Rule must then either be revised or repealed. But the court
deprived by its own devices of all collaboration must go it alone by
the crude method of trial and error. 6 And that error may not appear
as error, the path of revision must be retraced ever so slowly. Then
shortly it became too late for this court, the Vanderbilt court, to retrace its path. On November 13, 1956, the date of argument of Local
449, that court was still substantially intact: the Chief Justice, Justices
Heher, Oliphant, Wachenfeld and Burling had all been a part of the
court from its beginning. Sweeping changes were soon, however, to
follow. Six days later, on November 19th, Justice Weintraub was appointed to the court. 67 On August 20, 1957, he became Chief Justice,
succeeding Arthur T. Vanderbilt who died suddenly on June 20,
1957.168 During the next three years, the four remaining original jus165 It would only be just to say that Justice Jacobs, in his dissent in Otis and in his
opinion in Janovsky, and Judge Clapp in his opinion in Blut strove to create a body of
law on this subject during this period. But their efforts were decidedly outweighed by the
influence of Chief Justice Vanderbilt, who set the tone in his opinions in Liberty Title,
Koretzky, Driscoll, Haines, Otis and Bank of Commerce.
166 See note 94 supra.
167 He succeeded Justice Brennan who had resigned the previous month to accept an
appointment to the United States Supreme Court. The seventh justice of the court at
that time was Nathan Jacobs, who had been appointed in March, 1952.
168 On the same day Justice Weintraub became Chief Justice, John J. Francis became
an Associate Justice.
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tices of the supreme court either retired or died in
By the fall
of 1960 a new court had formed which for convenience we shall call
the Weintraub court.
This new court was free to re-examine, free to change. In the matter of counsel fees, it had inherited a policy embodied in a rule seemingly simple and easy of application. The difficulties we have discussed
had been quietly buried: the cases arising thereunder treated in isolation and without systemization. The process of this procedure had been
apparently highly successful. But do things differently, try to explain
and systematize, and the difficulties will become apparent and abound.
Intelligence bent to the task of justifying such an inheritance was
bound to fall. The study of that failure will occupy our attention in
the following section.
V.

THE WEINTRAUB

COURT CONSTRUES THE RULE

Preliminary Remarks

Because the sequence in which the cases came before the Weintraub court was of great importance in their decisions, we shall in this
section discuss them, for the most part, in that order. The first of them,
involving the construction of paragraph (d) of the Rule, determined
the extent of the exception announced in Local 449.170 In the next series of cases, those construing the "fund in court" provision of paragraph (b) of the Rule, we shall see how the formula set forth in
Caltagironel7 1-"the subject of litigation"-came to be abandoned;
and how the court came to read the provision in the exclusive terms
of the Cintas case. 172 Then, after a fruitful digression to the moneylender cases arising under paragraph (c) of the Rule, we shall return
with the court to the climactic case of Grober v. Kahn,173 involving,
once again, the construction of "fund in court." There we shall see
the court divide, revealing such fundamental inadequacies in the Rule
and its underlying policy as to breed in the Weintraub court, as in the
Vanderbilt court before it, a distaste for the process of construction
169 On Oct. 28, 1957, A. Dayton Oliphant retired, succeeded by Hayden Proctor; on
Feb. 24, 1959, William A. Wachenfeld retired, succeeded by Frederick W. Hall; on March
30, 1959, Harry Heher retired, succeeded by C. Thomas Schettino; and on Oct. 29, 1960,
Alfred E. Burling died, succeeded the following month by Vincent S. Haneman.
170 See notes 147-51 supra and accompanying text.
171 See notes 99 et seq. supra and accompanying text.
172 See notes 118 et seq. supra and accompanying text.
173 47 N.J. 135, 219 A.2d 601 (1966).
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and explanation. Thereafter, the judicial process will be subsumed in
the legislative and we shall have entered a new phase.
Paragraph(d)--Local 449 Isolated
The first of the cases to be considered, DeBow v. Lakewood Hotel
and Land Association,174 does not, strictly speaking, belong in this section. For the decision, that of the appellate division, was rendered at
a time, October 1958, when the Weintraub court was not yet in existence. Three of the justices who were subsequently to sit on that court
had not as yet received their appointment. 175 The supreme court was
thus in a stage of transition not only in personnel, but in manner of
decision. Therefore, because of its place in time, the opinion in DeBow
reflected the approach of the Vanderbilt court.
The facts in DeBow are these. Three corporate defendants in a
stockholder's derivative suit moved, pursuant to the then N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14:3-15, for an order requiring plaintiff to furnish security to
them for, in the words of the statute, "reasonable expenses, including
counsel fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such action." This provision, it will be observed, was similar to the statutory
provision involved in Local 449.
The trial court granted the motion, but after dismissing the derivative claims, denied the corporations' applications for counsel fees.
They appealed, relying on the opinion in Local 449 which had fashioned out of similar language in the statute governing labor disputes
a legislative policy to authorize the allowance of counsel fees. Unfortunately for them, however, unlike the situation in Local 449, there
was in the case of § 14:3-15 no reference thereto by rule of court and
thus their argument had to fail.
Of course, this had the appearance of the arbitrary: that the one
statute favoring a labor union should somehow be deserving of incorporation in the rules and that the other favoring a corporation should
not. Anything the court said on this topic would only render the arbitrary obtrusive and the body attempting to justify the arbitrary offensive. Nevertheless, it tried.
Section 14:3-15, it said, did not itself assure a counsel fee; it merely
assured, if a fee were allowed, the availability of a resource for payment. It ignored the fact that similar language had been construed in
Local 449 as assuring more than the availability of a resource: the assurance of the allowance itself.
174 52 N.J. Super. 288, 145 A.2d 493 (App. Div. 1958).
175 See note 169 supra.
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Then, and rather surprisingly, it cited in passing the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.176 But in that case that court had held the very provision
in question to be, under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins177 as amplified in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,' 178 substantive rather
than procedural. Thus it was to be applied in a stockholder's derivative
suit brought in a federal district court in New Jersey based on diversity
of citizenship. And what is more, Cohen had gone on to hold that the
statute had in fact authorized more than the mere availability of a security in the event of an allowance; it had authorized the allowance
itself.
The analysis in Cohen is of more than passing interest. It goes to
the heart of the basic distinction between the realm of the substantive
and that of the procedural with a clarity that must indeed have been
unsettling to a superior court judge. And it declares the heretical notion that the allowance of counsel fees is no mere procedural matter,
but of the order of substantive law.
This is what the Court said:
Even if we were to agree that the New Jersey statute is procedural, it would not determine that it is not applicable. Rules which
lawyers call procedural do not always exhaust their effect by regulating procedure. But this statute is not merely a regulation of procedure. With it or without it the main action takes the same course.
However, it creates a new liability where none existed before, for
it makes a stockholder who institutes a derivative action liable for
the expense to which he puts the corporation and other defendants,
if he does not make good his claims. Such liability is not usual and
it goes beyond payment of what we know as "costs." If all the Act
did was to create this liability, it would clearly be substantive. But
this new liability would be without meaning and value in many
cases if it resulted in nothing but a judgment for expenses at or
after the end of the case. Therefore, a procedure is prescribed by
which the liability is insured by entitling the corporate defendant
to a bond of indemnity before the outlay is incurred. We do not
think a statute which so conditions the stockholder's action can be
179
disregarded by the federal court as a mere procedural device.
Thus the majority in Cohen read the statute as the supreme court
had read the other statute in Local 449, as both conferring power on
the trial court to make an allowance for counsel fees and to require the
posting of a security for such an allowance. Justices Douglas and Frank176
177
178

179

337
304
326
337

U.S. 541 (1949).

U.S. 64 (1938).
U.S. 99 (1945).
U.S. at 555-56 (emphasis added).
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furter dissented only as to the necessity in a federal court of posting the
security. They regarded that requirement as, in a diversity context,
procedural.18 All had agreed, however, that the provision for the allowance itself was the creation of a new liability and thus clearly substantive. This was, of course, an unmentionable by a New Jersey court.
Cohen would seem a case to have been avoided or "distinguished," not
to have been cited in support.
But DeBow blundered on, perhaps by now in nervousness. It proceeded to save the statute from judicial repeal by holding that it "still
has viability insofar as requiring the posting of security is concerned."''1 1 Security for what? For reasonable expenses including counsel fees which, under the basic policy of the New Jersey Supreme Court
as evidenced in the then existing rules, are not to be allowed? This
reason will not hold either.
Finally, and as though in desperation, DeBow came to rest in a
simpler and sounder alternate holding. The statutory allowance of
counsel fees, if there be such, is superseded, it said, because it deals
with "procedure," as held by the supreme court in Otis.182 This we
can accept: not argument speciously arrayed, but stark naked precedent. Even mistake, if honestly disclosed, carries a certain dignity of
its own.
Interestingly, despite this decision, the legislature has in its recent revision of corporate legislation expressly provided for the payment to a corporation of "the reasonable expenses, including fees of
attorneys, incurred ... in the defense of" a stockholder's derivative action upon a finding of the court "that the action was brought without
reasonable cause.' 18 3 And it reenacted the prior requirement of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14:3-16 for the posting of security for such reasonable expenses. 8 4 The Comments of the Commissioners for Revision are clear
that the intent is in reaffirmation of the result and reasoning in Cohen
and in derogation of result and reasoning in DeBow. In fact, the Commissioners specifically recommended to the supreme court the amendment of its rule governing a stockholder's secondary action so as to
provide that " '[i]n any such action ... the rules of court do not supersede [the statute].'
180

181
182

"15

Id. at 557.
52 N.J. Super. at 295, 145 A.2d at 497.
See notes 70-90 and 118-26 supra and accompanying text.

14A:3-6(2) (1969).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6(3) (1969).
185 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6 (1969) (Commissioners' Comment-1968). See also
provision for allowance of counsel fees to a dissenting stockholder in an action brought
183 N.J. STAT. ANN. §
184
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These statutory provisions took effect January 1, 1969. Shortly
thereafter, the New Jersey Supreme Court published its new revision
of the rules governing practice and procedure in the courts, effective
September 8, 1969. The number of the rule affecting a "secondary action by shareholders" was changed to RULE 4:32-5. The rule itself,
however, did not include the Commissioners' recommendation. Nor
was any reference made to this recommendation in the Reporter's commentary to the new rule.
In the absence of any provision or commentary, we do not know
what the supreme court would do today with the purported creation
of a new liability for counsel fees under § 14A:3-6(2); whether it would,
following the naked precedents of Otis and DeBow, declare it invalid,
or, following the tack of Mayflower'186 and later cases, decide it was
"exceptional" and controlling. And in the absence of guidance on this
subject from the New Jersey Supreme Court, it is not at all clear what
a federal district court in New Jersey should do with this statute in a
case before it on diversity. If it considered DeBow as still controlling,
it should, of course, ignore the construction given the prior statute in
Cohen by the United States Supreme Court, and deny the creation of
any liability under the statute on the grounds that in the context of
Erie, as amplified by Guaranty Trust, the matter is "substantive" and
controlled by state law, albeit the very matter in the state court is considered "procedural." u 87 All in all, DeBow is not too happy an opinion.
But then Local 449 had not embodied a happy exception.
A newly constituted court coming across this exception for the
first time would, if it were acting in a spirit of moderation and conservatism, likely move to limit the exception and by careful explanation distinguish the reach of its extension, although perhaps declining
to overrule it outright. This was the course adopted by the Weintraub
court when at last duly formed, it was, in the case of United States Pipe
& Foundry Co. v. Steelworkers, Local 2026,188 confronted with the problem of Local 449.
Actually, the opinion involved two cases. In the first, an employerobtained strike injunction was dissolved on appeal by the appellate
against his corporation to determine the fair value of his shares. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:118 and 11-10.
186 See notes 158-59 supra and accompanying text. For other exceptional cases see
notes 150-57 and 161 supra and accompanying text. Still other cases will be discussed infra.
187 Although the authority of Guaranty Trust has been somewhat weakened by the
later decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), it would still seem to be controlling in this case, no federal rule of procedure being involved.
188 37 N.J. 343, 181 A.2d 353 (1962).
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division because the trial court had failed to follow certain procedural
requirements, such as making its findings promptly after the conclusion of the hearings. Thereupon the union asked for an allowance of
counsel fees in reliance on the statute followed in Local 449. The supreme court declined to apply the statute. It noted that the appellate
division had reversed not on the merits-as to that, that court had considered the injunction justified-but for procedural reasons. Thus the
employer had not been responsible for the dissolution. It should not
be answerable for counsel fees. The statutory authorization should be
confined to a case of reversal and consequent dissolution on the merits.
In the second action, Pipe had brought suit seeking a declaration
that the matter of a certain employee's discharge was not within the
scope of a provision in its collective bargaining agreement providing
for arbitration of a dispute concerning discharge of an employee. It
also sought and obtained an order restraining the union and the employee from proceeding in arbitration until the declaratory proceeding
had been determined. Eventually, the appellate division determined
the matter was arbitrable and dissolved the restraint. The trial court
denied a union application for counsel fees and the supreme court affirmed. It held that the matter was not a "labor dispute" within the
meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act, whose purpose it was to head off
strikes with their accompanying violence and to prevent the use of the
injunction as a strike-breaking implement. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-53
therefore did not apply. The court expressly refused, however, to accede to Pipe's request that Local 449 be overruled.
The court's position was this: Local 449 had established § 2A: 1553 as, in effect, another rule allowing counsel fees. It would accept the
statutory policy, examine it, measure its scope and apply it accordingly.
More than this, it would not do. The statute would be kept in intelligent isolation.
Such a policy could not, however, work with the other troublesome provisions of the Rule, paragraphs (b) and (c). As to "fund in
court" for instance, there were too many precedents to consider, their
breadth and meaning uncertain. As for the mortgage foreclosure proceeding, its arrangement was radically out of line: moneylenders without security were able to provide for an allowance in full for counsel
fees by pre-existing contractual provision.IS9 Why should the posting
of security affect the result? These problems were more difficult of solution.
189 See notes 150-57 supra and accompanying text.
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Paragraph (b)-"fund in court": The "subject of litigation" CasesSunset's Facts and Opinion
Almost the first case with which the Weintraub court became involved in the construction of that troublesome provision, "fund in
court," was that of Sunset Beach Amusement Corp. v. Belk, 190 decided
in 1960. Unfortunately, for a court unused to the subtleties contained
in the decisions construing the phrase, this case was tricky. This combination, early and tricky, probably contributed to the unsatisfactory
opinion and the court's eventual undoing.
The lower court had granted allowances to all the parties involved
out of escrow moneys actually deposited with the court, apparently because the sum had been "the subject of litigation." On review, the supreme court, in a striking departure from precedent, abandoned all
reference to "the subject of litigation" formula, choosing instead to
formulate a test of its own, to be exclusive thereafter in all "fund in
court" cases.
The background is as follows. Sunset and Belk entered into an
agreement for the sale of the Sunset Amusement Park to Belk. Belk
on signing the contract posted by check the sum of $25,000 in escrow
with a title company, and later arranged for the placement of two other
checks totaling $225,000, in escrow with the same company.
Following a dispute, Belk demanded a return of the moneys and
Sunset filed its complaint, suing for specific performance. The title
company in response moved to interplead the sums it was holding in
escrow. Its application was granted, the trial court directing it to deposit with the court the check for $25,000 and to hold the remaining
checks. After trial, the court entered a judgment for specific performance against Belk, but denied such relief as against a co-defendant
Varbalow, who, as Belk's sponsor, had signed the two later checks for
$225,000. It further allowed to counsel for the title company a fee of
$250 for his services in filing the complaint for interpleader. That allowance was unchallenged and the supreme court later regarded it as
correct. On appeal, the supreme court modified the judgment, directing that specific performance be required of Varbalow as well and that
he be required to endorse the checks totalling $225,000, thereby enabling the title company to collect them. 9 1
Upon remand, Sunset applied, in a proceeding to settle the form
190 33 N.J. 162, 162 A.2d 834 (1960). Actually the first case involving "fund in court"
to come before the Weintraub court was the fairly simple one of Leeds & Lippincott Co.
v. Nevins, 30 N.J. 281, 153 A.2d 45 (1959), discussed infra.
191 31 N.J. 445, 158 A.2d 35 (1960).
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of judgment in accordance with the mandate, for an allowance of costs
and counsel fees. Thereupon counsel for the title company made application for a further allowance in his favor. And counsel for the defendants, while opposing these applications, moved in the alternative
and without prejudice to their main position for an allowance on their
behalf as well.
The trial court regarded the sum of $24,750 in the hands of the
clerk of the court (the sum remaining after the payment to the title
company of its original allowance of $250) as a "fund in court." In its
judgment, it provided for the following. It ordered specific performance, directing that the closing proceed pursuant to contract, whereby
Sunset would receive the sum of $250,000 plus interest subject to certain named allowances, none of them relating to counsel fees. It directed defendants to pay to Sunset costs, including a "counsel fee of
$12,500 which is hereby allowed to said plaintiffs out of the fund in
court." Similarly, it directed the defendants to pay to the title company its costs, "including a counsel fee which is hereby allowed to said
defendant [title company] out of the fund in court." It then directed
these defendants to pay their own attorney their costs, to be "taxed as
between attorney and client, including a counsel fee of $2,500 which is
hereby allowed to said attorney out of the fund in court." Next, it directed the clerk to pay over the sum of $25,000 theretofore deposited
with him, less his commissions but plus accruals of interest, to the title
company "for the purpose of making distribution at consummation"
of the sale at the closing. Finally, it directed Varbalow to endorse the
checks totaling $225,000, held by the title company, for collection and
ultimately "for distribution at consummation" of the sale at closing. 1 92
But if the defendants were to specifically perform and thereby pay
plaintiff the sum of $250,000, and if to effect this payment, the Varbalow checks in the sum of $225,000 and the initial $25,000 check deposited by Belk with the clerk (after deducting the various allowances)
were to be used at time of closing, there would still be due and owing
at that time the amounts deducted for the allowances. Thus a further
payment in those amounts from the defendants to the plaintiff to complete the closing would mean, in effect, that the allowances, while
nominally out of the "fund in court," were ultimately coming out of
defendant's pockets. And this the judgment realistically contemplated.
This was the judgment, tricky, wrought by judicial leger-de-main,
from which the defendants appealed, opposing the allowances made.
192 Judgment of the trial court, set forth in Brief for Defendants-Appellants 19a-23a,
573 BRiEFS OF NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT.
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The appeal was briefed by the parties on the issues of timeliness in the
application for the allowances and of excessiveness in the amounts.
Sunset noted in its brief, as defendants conceded in their brief, the
deposit of $25,000 constituted a "fund in court," citing in. support
Katz v. Farber,and two partition cases. 193 Not surprisingly, the supreme
court rejected the approach of the parties and went off on its own
course. Deciding that there was no "fund in court" save for the title
company in interpleading, the court denied all other allowances. In
its- reasoning it first referred to what it considered to be the underlying
policy of the controlling rule, R.R. 4:55-7: to 'make each litigant bear
the cost of his own suit and to stop the prior practice in chancery which
had "proved unduly onerous upon litigants and spawned charges of
favoritism.' 1 94 The court then referred to the provisions of paragraph
(b) of the Rule and commented upon them as follows:
"Fund in court" is not too happy a term. It is a shorthand expression intended to embrace certain situations in which equitably
allowances should be made and can be made consistently with the
policy of the rule that each litigant shall bear his own costs. The
difficulty with the term is that literally it may connote a fund
within the precincts of the court in a physical or geographic sense
whereas "in court" refers to the jurisdictional authority of the court
to deal with the subject matter ....

And for that matter, the ex-

istence of power in the court to control the subject matter is not
itself enough to demonstrate the existence of a "fund in court"
within the purpose of the rule....
In general, allowances are payable from a "fund" when it
would be unfair to saddle the full cost upon the litigant for the
reason that the litigant is doing more than merely advancing his
own interests. 195

Typical, the court noted, were the situations in Cintasl96 (a stockholder's class action), Koretzky 197 (a suit to remove an executor), Ferguson' 9 (a will construction case), and Otis 99 (an escheat proceeding).
Farber, it argued, was not contrary to those views. There, it stated, it
had been held that as to the contending sellers there was a "fund in
193 For Farber, see notes 97-103 supra and accompanying text; for the partition cases,
see note 205 infra. For briefs of defendants-appellants and of plaintiffs-respondents, see
573 BIuEFs OF NEw JERSEY SUPREME COURT.
194 33 N.J. at 167, 162 A.2d at 837.
195 Id. at 168, 162 A.2d at 837.
196 See notes 101-03 and 172 supra and accompanying text.
197 See note 108 supra and accompanying text.

.198. See notes 110-11 supra and accompanying text.
199 See notes 70-90 and 118-26 supra and accompanying text.
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court" but that an allowance to these contenders had been denied
"doubtless because the claimants to the fund were acting solely to further their individual interests.

20 0

The case before it, the court analyzed to be a simple adversary
proceeding with each litigant representing his own interest and no
other. This applied to the title company as well, except for its initial
act in interpleading for which, and only for which, it was properly
awarded a fee of $250. The further allowance of $1,000 was compensation for services rendered in defending against the charge of conversion and as such must be set aside. The title company, like any other
adversary, must bear the costs of its own defense. Similarly, the allowances to Sunset Beach and to the defendants were improper and must
be set aside.
Sunset: a critique of its holding. The opinion in Sunset has much
to recommend it. It contains a systematic and, in some respects, excellent review of a good number of the Vanderbilt court's decisions, attempting for them what the Vanderbilt court had never attempted, a
reasonable and consistent explanation. But valiant and praiseworthy
though it may be, the attempt does not succeed. It fails in several respects.
In the first place, it is difficult to justify, insofar as all the litigants
are concerned, an action for will construction as one protecting the
estate or furthering its proper administration. While this may be true
of the fiduciary seeking his instructions, it hardly fits the role of the
competing beneficiaries, each of whom, as did Belk and Sunset Beach,
merely act to further his individual interests, unless perchance he be
a member of a class. Moreover, each such beneficiary would seem to
stand in the same relation to the assets of the estate in an action for
will construction as did Sunset Beach and Belk to the moneys held in
20 1
escrow and interpleaded.
Second, the Sunset reading of Farbercannot be correct, that while
there was a "fund in court" an award therein was denied because each
of the claimants was acting solely to further his own interests. For if
the formula set forth in Sunset be the exclusive formula-that for
there to be a "fund in court" there must be present in the action a
litigant doing something more than merely advancing his own interests
-there could be in Farber no such "fund."
200 33 N.J. at 170, 162 A.2d at 838.

201 The court apparently followed here an earlier suggestion in Blut v. Katz (see
notes 136-38 supra and accompanying text)- despite the explicit statement in Cintas that
the award in such an action was based on the estate being in the control of the court
and the subject matter thereof (see note 111 supra).
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The difficulty disappears if we return to Farberitself. There it was
said: "There may be such a fund when the money is actually in the
custody of the court and is the subject of the litigation. '20 2 Farberkept
separate the cases involving an administration of a trust, including the
accounting of a decedent's estate; the cases involving a fund for the
benefit of a class, as in Cintas; and the cases involving moneys actually
in the custody of the court, the subject of litigation. And although the
Sunset opinion omitted any reference to this last type of case, it was
exactly that type which the court in Farber considered the case before
it to be:
In the instant case the Court of Chancery had no fund in court
so long as the wife's interest was actually a right of inchoate dower
in real estate. But the parties by consent deposited moneys in court
"subject to the rules" of the court there to remain until disposal of
the same by order of the court upon appropriate application by
the defendants or either of them. The money was not only in the
custody of the court, it was the subject of the pending litigation.
We regard the deposit as a fund in court against which an allowance for counsel fee could be made in the discretion of the court in
proper instance. The trial court had jurisdiction; but upon the
merits of the application the allowance should have been, as it was,
denied. 203
The best explanation for Farberis that Mrs. Farber was denied her application because on the merits she had lost the case.
From this, the third failure in the Sunset reading of the various
precedents will be evident: the lack therein of any reference to the
formula advance in Caltagirone that "Money . ..actually in the custody of the court ... the subject of litigation" also constitutes a "fund
in court." And finally, the ultimate failure, the determination that all
the precedents could be reconciled and summarized under the single
formula that the litigant, to be rewarded, must have been advancing
more than his own interest.
Yet it must be said that for all these failures the actual decision in
Sunset seems almost correct. Disregarding the misunderstandings in its
opinion, let us examine its facts in the light of the precedents as we
have stated them. If Farberwas to be followed and applied, not rewritten, this would take care of defendants. They were unsuccessful and
cannot get an allowance.
Sunset, though the successful party, stands in no better position.
As we have already pointed out, escrow moneys paid into court and
202
203

4 N.J. at 344-45, 72 A.2d at 868.
Id. at 344-45, 72 A.2d at 868 (emphasis added).
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the subject of the interpleader-the check of the defendants to the
plaintiff in the sum of $25,000 in down payment-had been determined by the trial court to have been the property of the plaintiff.
Thus, while according to the formula in Caltagirone, the moneys did
constitute a "fund in court," this could not help Sunset. For an award
from such a fund would be a draft on its own resources. And to arrange, by a subsequent order, that defendants make good at the closing
the depletion in the deposit, amounts to a direction that the allowances
be paid not out of the "fund" but out of the defendants' own pockets.
20 4
It is a variation on the theme of Long v. Mertz and Blut v. Katz.
The trial court's allowance to the title company, while seeming to
rest on different grounds, is also in no better position. The moneys
which it had deposited in court following its interpleader were, it is
true, the subject of its litigation with both the plaintiff and the defendants. Hence, under Caltagirone, they would seem to constitute a
"fund in court." Moreover, to a limited extent, the extent open to an
interpleading party, the title company had been successful. It had
avoided a judgment for liability (the defendants had charged it with
conversion) and relieved itself of any further responsibility for the
disposal of the escrow moneys. And unlike the plaintiffs who had been
successful in the main case, the title company did not own the "fund";
thus it was available as a source of payment for its counsel fees. There
is also an apparently plausible ground in policy supporting an allowance in its favor. To encourage the faithful performance of the fiduciary duties of an escrow agent at reasonable rates, to confine the
expense of defending disputes arising from the performance of these
duties to the controversies in which they arise, the expense of a successful defense against a charge of misconduct should, as in the case
of the administration of an estate or trust, be paid out of the assets
served. But a closer examination will dispose of this argument.
In the case of an estate or trust, the initiative for its establishment
rests with the testator or settler; if there be an allowance, it is his property which bears the burden. And this is appropriate, since it was his
disposition which gave rise to the controversy. In the case of the escrow
agreement, while the initiative for its establishment rests with the
parties served, the property involved belongs either to the one or the
other, depending upon the outcome of the case. To make an allowance
out of the property of the winner, though not at fault, would be inappropriate. The burden of counsel fees, however, cannot be placed upon
the loser without directing that they be paid, not out of the "fund" but
204 See notes 136-38

supra and accompanying text.
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out of his pocket. And it makes no difference whether one confines the
allowance to the services rendered in filing the interpleader or extend
it to the services rendered during the entire conduct of the cause. Limited or not, the award must come out of the loser's pocket to spare the
winner's right to the "fund."
If so, then the formula of Caltagironeshould not apply, because in
a case of this kind it would lead to absurdity, whether the allowance be
for the winner or loser or the man in the middle, the interpleader. This
then is the proper reading of the Sunset facts in the light of the preSunset precedents. 205 It is a very cautious exercise. It holds merely that
neither Caltagirone nor Farber applies. It overrules nothing; it abandons nothing. It accomplishes little: the proper adjudication of its
own case without the upset of precedent.
And with this, we come to the real significance of Sunset, the substantial harm it involved. The light it shed on Farber and Ferguson
is uncertain; its abandonment of Caltagirone unnecessary; the development of its own formula in replacement of all that went before it
hasty and premature; and its application to the facts of the case at hand
uneven. For surely the title company was merely advancing its own
interests in filing for interpleader, to escape the possibility of two inconsistent judgments against it. And surely the allowance the supreme
court affirmed came not out of the "fund in court," but out of the
pockets of the losing party. Indeed, it can be said that after Sunset we,
if not the court, are left in an enveloping darkness.
The method of Sunset. Sunset in its methodology, it must be said
for the court, did represent a substantial break with the past. In this
lies its importance. The court was trying to make the law of counsel
205 Two partition cases had been decided before Sunset and had been cited in
Sunset's brief in support of its position that there had been a "fund" before the trial
court: Baird v. Moore, 50 N.J. Super. 156, 141 A.2d 324 (App. Div. 1958) and Lipin v. Ziff,
53 N.J. Super. 443, 147 A.2d 601 (Ch. 1959). Following Caltagirone, these cases had found a
"fund" since moneys actually in the custody of the court were in such an action the
subject of litigation. Prior to the adoption of the rule on counsel fees, an award in a
partition action had been specifically authorized under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:71-46 (Law of
June 14, 1898, ch. 230, § 26, [1898] N.J. Laws 653 (repealed 1951)), but this enactment was
repealed by the supreme court when in December, 1950, it amended the Rule by deleting
the phrase, "by law", in paragraph (d). The statute was formally repealed by the legislature when its provisions were not carried over into Title 2A.
In the Lipin case, however, while the court held there was a "fund" because it was
the subject of litigation, it limited an allowance to the plaintiff only for those services
rendered for all the parties, thus anticipating the holding in Sunset. Of course, partition
is not always a benefit for all the parties concerned. Should, after Sunset, a trial court
examine all the circumstances of the case or should it deem there to be benefit in any
case? In any case hereafter, in view of Sunset, a trial court should not find a "fund"
simply because the action made the property the subject of litigation.
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fees readily understandable in reasonable -terms. For better or for worse,
the court under its new chief justice was committed to explanation. To
use the language of Dicey, it was aiming "at the maintenance of the
logic or symmetry of the law."20 6
- But unfortunately for the court, it had in Sunset attempted too
much. The law of "fund in court" and of counsel fees in general was
far more complicated than it supposed, the needs it served much larger
than could be embraced in the single, narrow test it had wrought. And
With its logical conscience, its devotion to symmetry and care for con:
sistency, the court will shortly be brought to the point of dissension and
division. This impending quarrel could have been avoided had the
court in Sunset, intent upon analysis and reconciliation of the precedents, been faithful to all the precedents, those following Caltagirone
as well as those following Cintas, or, expressly considering the former,
overruled them.
Even so, some kind of trouble was probably inevitable. If Sunset
has unwittingly aggravated the problem of "fund in court" allowances,
it had not created it. The Weintraub court, with its trust in reason, was
laboring on a pile of unreason. It did not know what it was getting
into. New to the subject of counsel fees, it was working on certain
assumptions: that the rule on counsel fees was a simple matter of
practice and procedure (that it could be a matter of substantive law and
the law of remedy had probably at that stage not entered its collective
head); that, while severe in its prohibitions, it had worked well in practice; that the provision "fund in court," while "not too happy a term,"
could readily, as in Sunset, be refashioned so as to do an adequate job;
that, on the whole, the problem was routine and incidental and with the
use of a little intelligence and consistency it could be disposed of readily
for good.
But such assumptions, as has been shown, were erroneous. The
rule on counsel fees purported to be systematic: a codification of the
various interests to be protected and unprotected from the burden of
litigation. As such, it constituted a drastic prospective incursion upon
these areas of substantive law and remedy. In fact, it did not reflect any
systematic point of view. The Vanderbilt court apparently had never
conducted a thorough study of the subject. It was quite a trick: to
produce a systematic rule in the absence of a systematic study.
To protect itself against this structural weakness, the Vanderbilt
court had taken refuge in certain devices. It explained as little as possible. Leaving the term "fund in court" vague, it permitted itself a case206

See note 94 supra.
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to-case flexibility akin to the common law method in affording and
modifying remedies. In operation, the Rule, by remaining vague and
little defined, could constitute the source for affording a remedy, continuing thereby to be somewhat workable in an area inherently remedial. For the Vanderbilt court, the words "fund in court" were a very
happy term.
Eliminate this tempering flexibility, apply the Rule in all consistency as though it were a rule, specific and good for all the occasions
it purported to cover; as though it were a rule of procedure, instead of
a rule controlling in advance the determination in every case of interests to be protected and policies to be selected or rejected. The results
will be patently chaotic, erratic and confusing.
Since there was no underlying plan to the rule on counsel fees, the
Weintraub court, coming to the task of its construction, with minds
trained in the law, with a conscience for clarity and logical consistency,
could only uncover for itself trouble: not a plan, but the buried skeletons of its predecessors in office. Let us now watch the trouble building
in the following cases.
EDITORIAL NOTE: This ends part one of a two-part article. Part two will appear in
volume 4, no. 2.

